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STRATOSPHERIC OZONE DEPLETION: A
CHALLENGE FOR INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
Ved P. Nanda*
I. INTRODUCTION
Researchers discovered in the fall of 1987 that the loss of ozone in
the Antarctic had climbed to 50 percent during the austral spring,1 a
phenomenon not predicted by theorists' models and studies of the
chemical behavior of stratospheric gases.2 This was accompanied by a
finding that chlorine monoxide levels at certain altitudes revealed 500
times normal concentrations. 3
On the heels of this disquieting discovery, the authoritative Inter-
national Ozone Trends Panel,4 a creation of the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA), in collaboration with other fed-
eral agencies and international organizations, including the United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), reported a global loss of
ozone during the past seventeen years.5 A few months later, in May
1988, a group of scientists at the Polar Ozone Workshop in Snowmass,
Colorado, reported the first evidence of ozone destruction in the Arc-
* Thompson G. Marsh Professor of Law and Director, International Legal Studies Pro-
gram, University of Denver College of Law.
I am grateful to several of my colleagues at the University of Denver College of Law Library,
especially Patricia Murphy and Mary Wilder, and to Dolores Eddy, Librarian, EPA Region
Eight Library in Denver, for locating and acquiring for me several congressional reports and
documents and other recently released government documents which were not yet generally
available. I am also indebted to Steve Berlant, J.D., 1988, University of Denver College of Law,
for his research assistance.
1. R. W. WATSON et al, PRESENT STATE OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE UPPER ATMOSPHERE
1988: AN ASSESSMENT REPORT 18 (NASA Ref. Pub. 1208, Aug. 1988) [hereinafter OZONE
TRENDS PANEL REPORT]. See also Shabecoff, Antarctic Ozone Loss Is Worsening, N.Y. Times,
October 1, 1987, at 16, col. 4.
2. See Kerr, Ozone Hole Bodes Ill for the Globe, 241 SCIENCE 785 (1988).
3. Shell, Solo Flights into the Ozone Hole Reveal Its Causes, SMITHSONIAN, Feb. 1988, at 142,
154 (reported by James Anderson, Philip S. Weld Professor in Atmospheric Chemistry at
Harvard University).
4. In the fall of 1986 NASA decided to coordinate and sponsor with the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), the National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the World
Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), a
review of all ground-based and satellite-based data. Ifiedt selected the Ozone Trends Panel, com-
prising eminent scientists from federal agencies, research institutions, private industry, and uni-
versities. OZONE TRENDS PANEL REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
5. Id. at 4.
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tiC.6 A consensus has seemingly emerged in the scientific community
that humanly-induced chemical change in the stratosphere is responsi-
ble in whole, or in part, for the rapid depletion of Antarctic ozone.7
Another phenomenon of growing concern is global warming. In
November 1988, a joint intergovernmental panel of the United Na-
tions Environment Programme ("UNEP") and the World Meteoro-
logical Organization ("WMO") considered global warming as "the
most important environmental concern of our day."' 8 One of the
panel's tasks is to study the impact of the increased concentration in
the atmosphere of greenhouse gases, which include carbon dioxide
(CO2), methane, nitrogen oxides, and chlorofluorocarbons ("CFCs"),
on global climate.9
Implications of these trends - stratospheric ozone loss and global
warming - are far-reaching.10 They have prompted scientists to fur-
ther test and refine their models and theories,'" and have challenged
decision makers to explore policy options with an unprecedented ur-
gency.12 A study of the legal framework within which decision mak-
ers can effectuate their preferred policies constitutes the focus of this
article. Thus, the first part of the article addresses the phenomenon of
stratospheric ozone depletion, noting significant recent developments,
and discussing their ramifications. This is followed by an inquiry into
pertinent international and U.S. responses to ozone depletion. Recent
developments in international environmental law provide an appropri-
ate context for this inquiry. The adequacy of these responses is as-
6. See Kerr, Evidence ofArctic Ozone Destruction, 240 SCIENCE 1144 0988). See also Scien-
tist Fears Hole in Ozone Is Developing Over the Arctic, N.Y. Times, May 18, 1988, at 10, col. 5;
Browne, New Ozone Threat: Scientists Fear Layer Is Eroding at North Pole, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11,
1988, at B7, col. 1.
7. See OZONE TRENDS PANEL REPORT, supra note 1, at 3.
8. For a brief report on the 30-country panel's November 9-11 meeting in Geneva, see I 1
Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA), at 644 (Dec. 14, 1988).
9. Id.
10. See generally U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 1-8 ASSESSING THE RISKS
OF TRACE GASSES THAT CAN MODIFY THE STRATOSPHERE (Office of Air and Radiation, Dec.
1987) [hereinafter ASSESSING THE RISKS OF TRACE GASSES].
11. See generally Kerr, Is the Greenhouse Here?, 239 SCIENCE 559, 561 (1988).
12. In the 100th Congress, two bills were introduced in the U.S. Senate: Senate Bill 2663/
2666, entitled the "Global Environment Protection Act of 1988," introduced on July 27, 1988,
by Senators Stafford, Baucus, Chafee, Durenberger, and Gore (S. Res. 2663,2666, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. S10112, 10282 (1988)) [hereinafter Stafford Bill]; and Senate Bill 2667,
to establish a national energy policy to reduce global warming, and for other purposes, intro-
duced on July 28, 1988, by Senators Wirth, Johnston, Bumpers, Fowler, Matsunaga, Pell,
Melcher, Sanford, Gore, Stafford, Baucus, Chafee, Danforth, Bingham, Inouye, Heinz, Evans,
and Harkin, (S. Res. 2667, id. at S10282 (1988)) [hereinafter Wirth Bill]. In the 101st Congress,
several more bills were introduced. See infra notes 285, 290-291.
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sessed in the next section. Recommendations follow in the concluding
section.
II. STRATOSPHERIC OZONE DEPLETION
A. The Problem
Ozone is a pollutant at ground level and low altitudes. 13 However,
in the upper part of the atmosphere, known as the stratosphere, it acts
as a barrier against the ultraviolet rays of the sun, effectively absorbing
them and thus protecting the earth from their harmful effects on
human health, agricultural productivity, and fisheries. 14 That is why
its loss in the stratosphere is critical.
Ozone occurs in the stratosphere as ultraviolet solar radiation
causes photochemical reactions, continuously converting oxygen (02)
to ozone (03) and back to oxygen. 15 Human activities are disturbing
this production-and-loss balance and are causing ozone layer modifica-
tion by chemical catalytic processes of nitrogen, chlorine, and hydro-
gen oxides 16 To illustrate, chlorine is a catalytic agent which destroys
ozone by promoting the following reactions: 17 a chlorine (Cl) atom
reacting with ozone (03) forms CIO and 02. CIO then reacts with
another 03, forming two molecules of 02 and releasing the chlorine
atom. Thus, after converting two molecules of ozone to three mole-
cules of oxygen the chlorine is ready to restart the process. Conse-
quently, a single chlorine atom is capable of destroying thousands of
ozone molecules before returning to the lower atmosphere, called trop-
osphere, and being rained out as hydrochloric acid.
Scientists have found a rapid increase in atmospheric concentra-
13. See, e.g., Russell, Ozone Pollution: The Hard Choices, 241 SCIENCE 1275-76 (1988);
Manserus, How the Lung Reacts to Ozone Pollution, N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1984, § 4, at 7, col. 1.
14. See R.T. WATSON, M.A. GELLER, R.S. STOLARSKI & R.F. HAMPSON, PRESENT STATE
OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE UPPER ATMOSPHERE: AN ASSESSMENT REPORT 19 (NASA Ref. Pub.
1162, May 1986) [hereinafter 1986 ASSESSMENT REPORT]; and infra § II.C.
15. See generally 1986 ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 14, at 22-23; Stordal & Isakson,
Ozone Perturbations Due to Increases in N20, CH4 and Chlorocarbons: Two-Dimensional Time-
Dependent Calculations, in 1 EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN STRATOSPHERIC OZONE AND GLOBAL
CLIMATE 83 (J. Titus ed., 1986) (an EPA & UNEP study) [hereinafter 1986 OZONE & CLIMATE
STUDY].
16. See 1986 ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 14, at 6-8; Stordal & Isakson, supra note 15,
at 84; Kerr, supra note 2, at 785, 786.
17. This simple model is taken from Titus & Seidel, Overview of the Effects of Changing the
Atmosphere, in 1986 OZONE & CLIMATE STUDY, supra note 15, at 4. See also Tolbert et al.,
Antarctic Ozone Depletion Chemistry: Reactions of N205 with H2O and HCl on Ice Surfaces, 240
SCIENCE 1018 (1988); Molina et al., Antarctic Stratospheric Chemistry of Chlorine Nitrate, Hy-
drogen Chloride, and Ice: Release of Active Chlorine, 238 SCIENCE 1253 (1987); Tolbert et al.,
Reaction of Chlorine Nitrate with Hydrogen Chloride and Water at Antarctic Stratospheric Tem-
peratures, 238 SCIENCE 1258 (1988).
[Vol. 10:482
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tions of a number of gases which affect atmospheric ozone.' 8 These
include CFCs, halons, methane, nitrous oxide, and carbon dioxide.
The challenge, therefore, is to prevent further increase of these gases in
the atmosphere. Additionally, since scientists have identified that the
release of chlorine-and bromine-containing chemicals (CFCs and
halons, respectively), for which human activities are responsible,
threatens the stability of the ozone layer in the polar vortex, 19 the
challenge is for decision makers to take appropriate preventive and
remedial steps. The 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer, 20 the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances That De-
plete the Ozone Layer,21 and the recent efforts to find substitutes for
CFCs22 are such steps. The pertinent question concerning the ade-
quacy of these measures will be studied later.
23
B. Evidence of the Loss
The major concern is with ozone loss in the stratosphere, which
extends from about eight kilometers at the poles and 17 km at the
equator to about 50 km above the earth's surface and is home to most
of the ozone in the atmosphere. 24 Scientists have been studying
changes both in the total column amount of atmospheric ozone and in
its vertical distribution for over 30 years, using data from the ground-
based Dobson spectro-photometer network, and since 1978, using data
from NASA's Nimbus-7 satellite-based instruments, Solar Backscatter
Ultraviolet (SBUV) and Total Ozone Mapping Spectrometer (TOMS),
the Stratospheric Aerosol and Gas Experiment (SAGE) spectrome-
ters, and the Solar Mesospheric Explorer (SME) spectrometers. 25 The
first revelation that CFCs caused atmospheric ozone destruction was
made in 1974, when two scientists, M.J. Molina and F.S. Rowland
reported that "[p]hotodissociation of the chlorofluoromethanes in the
stratosphere produces significant amounts of chlorine atoms and leads
18. See supra notes 10, 16.
19. See generally OZONE TRENDS PANEL REPORT, supra note 1, at 3,4,9.
20. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, March 22, 1985, reprinted in
26 I.L.M. 1516 (1987) [hereinafter Vienna Ozone Convention].
21. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, reprinted
in 52 Fed. Reg. 47515 (1987), and in 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
22. See infra notes 120-121 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 143-183 and accompanying text.
24. Watson, Atmospheric Ozone, in 1986 OZONE & CLIMATE STUDY, supra note 15, at 69.
25. See OZONE TRENDS PANEL REPORT, supra note 1, at 3, 16. A new ozone sensor, cost-
ing $5 million, to monitor changes in ozone concentrations, is now carried on a NOAA-l 1, a
spacecraft launched on September 24, 1988. See Broad, Satellite to Improve Monitoring of Ozone
Loss, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1988, at BI 1, col. 1.
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to destruction of atmospheric ozone."'26
According to the 1988 International Ozone Trends Panel Report,
there has been a measurable decrease in the average total column
ozone of 1.7 to 3 percent "in all latitude bands from 30 to 64 degrees
in the northern hemisphere from 1969 to 1986."27 During the winter
months, December through March, these decreases ranged from 2.3 to
6.2 percent. 28 Between 1978 and 1985, the TOMS satellite data
showed a decline of total ozone column in all latitude zones, the range
being 1.1 to 3.7 percent in the northern hemisphere, and 1.1 to 9 per-
cent in the southern hemisphere. 29 The Panel has also reported the
depletion in the vertical distribution of ozone during 1979 and 1985 to
maximize near 40 km, from 5 to 12 percent. 30 The decrease over this
time period is estimated at 4 to 9 percent in response to the increased
abundance of trace gases, and only 1 to 3 percent in response to the
reduced solar ultraviolet output.31
According to the Panel, there is evidence that natural events have
significantly affected this recent trend. 32 These events include natural
cycle geophysical changes such as the annual cycle of the seasons, the
quasi-biennial oscillation of the stratospheric winds, the 11-year solar
sunspot cycle, and natural effects of irregular transient phenomena,
such as the El Nino Southern Oscillation or volcanic eruptions. 33
The most dramatic discovery, however, was that of the Antarctic
ozone hole, an unusual loss of 50 percent of ozone in the total column
in the Antarctic springtime in 1987. 34 Data showed that, during the
last decade, the loss of total column ozone over Antarctica in the
springtime (September through November) had ranged between 30
and 40 percent. 35 In October 1987, the decline in ozone concentra-
tions between 15 and 20 km was over 95 percent compared with their
values in August 1987.36
26. Molina & Rowland, Stratospheric Sink for Chlorofluoromethanes: Chlorine Atom-Cata-
lyzed Destruction of Ozone, 249 NATURE 810 (June 1974). See also Rowland & Molina,
Chlorofluoromethanes in the Environment, 13 REv. GEOPHYS. SPACE PHYS. 1 (1975).
27. OZONE TRENDS PANEL REPORT, supra note 1, at 11.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 14.
30. Id. at 17.
31. Id.
32. See id., at 11-13.
33. For earlier assessments, see 1986 ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 14, at 14-15.
34. OZONE TRENDS PANEL REPORT, supra note 1, at 86.
35. Bowman, Global Trends in Total Ozone, 239 SCIENCE 48 (1988).
36. OZONE TRENDS PANEL REPORT, supra note 1, at 18, 87. Dense stratospheric clouds
form in the Antarctic and the ozone hole occurs within the polar vortex because of special condi-
tions there, caused by weather, an isolated air mass, and very cold temperatures, which are pre-
[Vol. 10:482
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Furthermore, scientists have found that, compared with October
1979, the monthly zonal mean amount of total ozone at latitudes 50,
60, 70, and 80 degrees south in October 1987, was about 8 percent, 20
percent, 40 percent, and 50 percent lower respectively. 37 It is esti-
mated that during spring, there is now a 15 percent ozone depletion in
southern Chile and Argentina compared with pre-1979 values.38 Ac-
cording to TOMS data, total column ozone has declined since 1979 by
over 5 percent at all latitudes south of 60 degrees throughout the
year.39
In 1988, two reports by scientists, one based upon "long-term,
ground-based observations, ' 4 0 and the other upon TOMS data,4'
claimed springtime-level ozone losses during the polar winter as well.
More recently, an arctic expedition which operated out of Norway
from January 1 to February 15, 1989,42 has confirmed the fear that the
unusual, perturbed chemistry found in the Antarctic also occurs in the
North Polar stratosphere. 43 It is also probable, based upon the ex-
isting analyses of global ozone data, that ozone losses are not confined,
to the polar regions.44
Predictions of ozone loss in the future vary, depending upon the
chemical and atmospheric models used.45 The discrepancy between
prior predictions and actual depletions in column ozone, however, is
noteworthy. Since 1969, at northern mid-latitudes, such depletions
have been two to three times greater than those predicted.46 Conse-
quently, while scientists are uncertain whether the Antarctic ozone
hole will spread over the southern hemisphere or the entire globe, and
what its global ramifications are likely to be, decision makers have to
requisites for perturbed chemistry. The reaction of chlorine under these conditions is especially
destructive of ozone. Id.
37. Id. at 87.
38. See Stolarski & Schoeberl, 13 GEOPHYS. RES. LETTERS 1240 (1986).
39. OZONE TRENDS PANEL REPORT, supra note 1, at 98,99.
40. See Kerr, supra note 6, at 1145.
41. See Kerr, supra note 2.
42. Shabecoff, Arctic Expedition Finds Chemical Threat to Ozone, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1989,
at 1, col. 3.
43. Id. at 1, col. 4; 8, col. 2.
44. See Stratospheric Ozone Depletion and Chlorofluorocarbons: Joint Hearings Before the
Subcomms. on Environmental Protection, and Hazardous Wastes and Toxic Substances, of the
Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., at 6 (1987)(statement
of Dr. F. Sherwood Rowland)[hereinafter STRATOSPHERIC OZONE DEPLETION AND CFCs]. See
also id. at 34-41; Weisburd, One Ozone Hole Returns, Another is Found, 130 Sol. NEWS 215
(1986); Ozone Hole Found over Europe, NEW SCL, Oct 6, 1986, at 21.
45. See OZONE TRENDS PANEL REPORT, supra note 1, at 103-27; ASSESSING THE RISKS OF
TRACE GASSES, supra note 10.
46. OZONE TRENDS PANEL REPORT, supra note 1, at 103.
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weigh the risk of inadequate action, which in the long view might be
very costly, against taking strong measures while scientific assessment
is still continuing.
C. Long-Term Consequences of Atmospheric Ozone Loss
Depletion in the total column of stratospheric ozone (the amount
of ozone found throughout the world)47 would allow harmful solar
ultraviolet radiation to penetrate to the surface of the earth, since
ozone is the only gas in the atmosphere to provide a barrier to such
radiation.48 Additionally, were vertical distribution of atmospheric
ozone to change, it could be a contributing factor in bringing about
regional and perhaps global climatic changes. 49 Consequently, unless
a proper balance of stratospheric ozone is maintained, adverse effects
on human and animal health, 50 and harmful effects on plants5 and
aquatic systems52 are likely to result from ultraviolet radiation expo-
sure at the earth's surface.
Ultraviolet (UV) radiation is usually divided into three wave
bands, UV-A, UV-B, and UV-C. 53 While UV-A is not carcinogenic at
usual exposure levels, it causes most photosensitive reactions, that is, it
exacerbates the symptoms of a number of skin diseases from sun expo-
sure in those who are excessively sensitive to UV radiation. 54 These
diseases include infectious diseases such as herpes simplex, altered
metabolic states, nutritional deficiency states, and some hereditary ge-
netic and immunologically-mediated diseases.55 Although UV-A is
not absorbed by ozone, it is reflected back to space, away from the
earth's surface.
UV-C, which can cause skin and eye cancers and skin inflamma-
47. If compressed to the pressure at the earth's surface, the layer of ozone would be about
one eighth of an inch thick. Watson, supra note 24.
48. See Frederick, The Ultraviolet Radiation Environment of the Biosphere, in 1986 OZONE &
CLIMATE STUDY, supra note 15, at 121.
49. See Hansen, et al., The Greenhouse Effect. Projections of Global Climate Change, in id. at
199.
50. See, e.g., U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ULTRAVIOLET RADIATION
AND MELANOMA (Office of Air and Radiation, 1987); see Frederick, supra note 48, at 121; Em-
mett, Health Effects of Ultraviolet Radiation, in 1986 OZONE & CLIMATE STUDY, supra note 15,
at 129; Wexler, Ozone Depletion and Ocular Risks From Ultraviolet Radiation, in id. at 147.
51. See Teramura, Overview of Our Current State of Knowledge of UV Effects on Plants, in id.
at 165.
52. See Worrest, The Effect of Solar UV-B Radiation on Aquatic Systems An Overview, in id.
at 175.
53. See Emmett, Health Effects of Ultraviolet Radiation, in id. at 129.
54. See id. at 138.
55. Id. at 137.
[Vol. 10:482
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tions, is at present almost all absorbed by stratospheric ozone. 56 UV-B
is at present partially absorbed by ozone, and its exposure is of greatest
concern since it is usually responsible for sunburn and skin cancer,
and has potentially adverse effect on the body's immune system."
Thus, the effectiveness of this shield is likely to be reduced if levels of
ozone continue to decline in the future.
Although other factors, including exposure to solar radiation, indi-
vidual susceptibility, personal behavior, and land elevation, 58 also in-
fluence the nature and gravity of chronic effects of ultraviolet
radiation, it is estimated that every one-percent decrease in total col-
umn ozone in the atmosphere results in a two-percent increase in UV-
B radiation, causing in turn an increase of 4.8 to 7.6 percent incidence
of nonmelanoma skin cancer. 59 Based upon the expected growth of
trace gases it is estimated that even a moderate percent annual growth
in current CFC emissions would lead to an increased incidence of non-
melanoma skin cancer cases in the United States of approximately 153
million people, which includes people alive today and born by the year
2075. Assuming that no advancement in medical technology takes
place, this increase could lead to 3 million deaths resulting from non-
melanomas in the same time period. Also, given the same assump-
tions, additional melanoma skin cancer cases would increase by ap-
proximately 782,100, and the number of resulting deaths would be
approximately 187,000 for the U.S. population alive today and born by
the year 2075. 60
While potential increased incidence of skin cancer is an area of
major concern, changes caused by longterm exposure to UV radiation
in the cornea, ocular lens, and retina are three main areas of concern
for adverse effects on the eye.61 Since both UV-B and UV-A are able
to penetrate the interior of the eye, they both can damage the eye.
Potential health problems include cataracts, stable vertical disorders,
retinal degeneration, and aging and developmental disorders.62 It is
estimated that the number of cataracts cases, for the United States
population alive today and born by the year 2075, would increase by
18.2 million based upon a moderate growth rate for current CFC
56. Id. at 130.
57. See STRATOSPHERIC OZONE DEPLETION AND CFCs, supra note 44, at 42; Shell, supra
note 3, at 143.
58. See STRATOSPHERIC OZONE DEPLETION AND CFCs, supra note 44, at 5, 126, 143.
59. Id. at 35, 44; 52 Fed. Reg. 47494 (1987)(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.82).
60. 52 Fed. Reg. 47494-95 (1987).
61. See STRATOSPHERIC OZONE DEPLETION AND CFCs, supra note 44, at 46.
62. See Wexler, supra note 50, at 147-48.
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levels. 63
After screening about 200 species of plants and different varieties
within species, scientists have found that two out of every three plants
tested showed some degree of UV sensitivity. 4 UV-irradiated plants
suffer from reduced leaf areas, plant stunting, a reduction in total dry
weight of the plant, and increased plant diseases. 65 Thus, future ozone
depletion could adversely affect the world's food supplies.
Harmful effects of UV-B radiation on marine organisms and the
marine food web include damage to fish larvae and juveniles, shrimp
larvae, crab larvae, and other small animals and plants which are es-
sential to sustain the marine food chain. 66 The long term result could
be an unstable ecosystem, and an adverse effect on higher levels of the
food chain,' such as shell fish and fin fish. 67 The conclusion is ines-
capable that future ozone depletion would drastically affect the
world's food supplies.
The United States Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA)
statement of December 14, 1987, provides an apt conclusion: "Based
on the WMO [World Meteorological Organization] assessment and
EPA's recently completed risk assessment, the Agency believes that
the current rate of growth in atmospheric levels of ozone-depleting
gases is likely to result in substantial depletion of ozone which would
lead to significant harm to human health and the environment." 68
63. 52 Fed. Reg. 47495 (1987). To mitigate the potential carcinogenic effects of increased
UV radiation exposure, humans could perhaps take partially effective measures relying upon
medical advancement and adapting their lifestyles to an increased UV intensity by using sun-
screen and becoming more aware of the hazards of UV radiation. There are some scientists,
however, who consider it unlikely that people will change their lifestyles in response to an in-
creased UV radiation intensity. See STRATOSPHERIC OZONE DEPLETION AND CFCs, supra note
44, at 46.
64. See Teramura, supra note 51; STRATOSPHERIC OZONE AND CFCs, supra note 44, at 48-
49.
65. See Teramura, supra note 51, at 170.
66. Zooplankton, which are tiny animals that drift in water and live primarily close to the
surface of the water, would be exposed to UV radiation. Similarly, phytoplankton, which are
tiny drifting plants and live near the water's surface in order to promote photosynthesis, would
be exposed. Since almost every aquatic species relies directly or indirectly on these two plants for
food, the food chain would be broken without these two planktons and the higher species which
depend upon them for food would starve, thereby beginning the cycle of starvation through the
aquatic food chain. Phytoplanktons and zooplanktons would probably swim deeper under water
to escape the UV radiation, and since they are dependent upon sunlight, the likelihood is that
they would grow less and thus would be of less nutritional value. See Worrest, supra note 52, at
179-83; STRATOSPHERIC OZONE DEPLETION AND CFCs, supra note 44, at 47; 52 Fed. Reg.
47495 (1987).
67. See STRATOSPHERIC OZONE DEPLETION AND CFCs, supra note 44, at 47.




The ozone hole has presented a new set of challenges to the deci-
sionmakers. As the scientists have found that atmospheric concentra-
tions of ozone-modifying gases are on the rise,69 and since the
emissions from CFCs and halons liberate chlorine atoms in the strato-
sphere by chemical actions with UV radiation and cause ozone deple-
tion,70 policymakers are left with no option but to regulate the
manufacture and use of ozone-depleting chemicals.
Table 1 shows a 5 percent annual increase since 1978 of CFC-11
and CFC-12 in the atmosphere, the former being used primarily as a
foam-blowing agent and the latter being used primarily as a refrigerant
in the United States. Abroad, however, both CFC- 11 and -12 are also
used as aerosol propellants. CFC-113, which is used primarily as a
solvent by electronics and metal-cleaning industries, has had a ten per-
cent annual increase in the atmosphere during the same period.
These increases reflect both continued emissions of CFCs during
this period and also the long atmospheric lifetimes of these chemicals,
(about 75 years for CFC- 11 and about 120 years for CFC- 12). 7 1 Thus,
it is clear that the existing atmospheric levels of CFCs would decrease
very slowly, even if emissions were reduced considerably, because the
very long lifetimes of these chemicals would ensure they will continue
to be added to the atmosphere much faster than they are destroyed. It
is estimated that, other things being equal, such as atmospheric tem-
peratures, it would take an immediate 85 percent emissions reduction
to stabilize CFC and ozone concentrations. 72
Crucial questions for policymakers relate to the nature of regula-
tions on the manufacture and use of ozone-depleting chemicals and
the efficacy of their implementation. A detailed discussion of these
questions follows. In a summary fashion, however, it should be noted
that the drafting of the 1985 Vienna Convention 73 and subsequently
the 1987 Montreal Protocol 74 attest to the selection of a formal multi-
lateral treaty route to accomplish the objective of bringing about emis-
sions reduction. The treaty route was appropriate, for the problem
69. See Table 1, infra note 145. See also supra note 10.
70. See supra notes 10, 16.
71. See STRATOSPHERIC OZONE DEPLETION AND CFCs, supra note 44, at 5 (Statement of
Dr. F. Sherwood Rowland).
72. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RISKS OF
STRATOSPHERIC MODIFICATION (Office of Air And Radiation, 1986).
73. See Vienna Ozone Convention, supra note 20.
74. See supra note 21.
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could not have been addressed effectively in an informal manner
through measures such as information exchanges and technical aid.
As to the nature of regulations, control measures have been pre-
scribed on both production and consumption of selected chemicals. 75
However, even before the entry into force of these control measures,
they are found wanting in their ability to effectuate the prevention of
further ozone depletion. 76 Thus, a further strengthening of these pre-
scriptive measures is in order. The control measures provide built-in
flexibility to address special situations, such as those of developing
countries.77
Implementation in the international arena always raises difficult
questions. In the setting of a multilateral convention, even when the
prescriptions are unambiguous and parties are clearly aware of their
obligations and rights as well as of the available remedies under the
agreement, how is the international community to ensure effective im-
plementation? The first requirement, of course, is that there be wide
ratification of the instrument. The second is that an effective institu-
tional structure be in place to inform, oversee and monitor; to invoke
and apply the norms; and to provide the available remedies. The third
is that appropriate procedures be established to provide reasonable ac-
cess to those invoking the agreement. The fourth is that there be suffi-
cient incentives and penalties to encourage observance. The fifth
requirement is that there be a compulsory dispute-settlement mecha-
nism provided under the agreement.
As the following discussion will show, some of these requirements
are met under the Montreal Protocol, but others have yet to be worked
out. To illustrate, the parties are to establish institutional mechanisms
and procedures to determine noncompliance at their first meeting after
the Protocol goes into effect in 1989.78 Also, the Protocol does pro-
vide for trade restrictions as a tool to enforce compliance, 79 although
its thrust is on voluntary compliance. There are numerous loopholes
in the control measures which the parties must address when they con-
vene.80 Another equally critical question is whether the policy under-
taken would provide the needed incentives for the development and
deployment of safe chemicals as replacements and substitutes for the
CFCs and halons.
75. See infra notes 146-157 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 196-206 and accompanying text.
77. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 21, art. 5.
78. Id., art. 8.
79. Id., art. 4.
80. See infra note 76.
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III. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRIOR TO THE 1985
VIENNA CONVENTION
The dearth of effective international norms and mechanisms to ad-
dress questions of global environment, especially its management, is a
reflection of the horizontal nature of the world community, which
generally lacks a centralized authority to prescribe norms. Conse-
quently, until recently, efforts toward environmental management
have been sporadic and ineffectual and the development of interna-
tional environmental law has been slow and its role rather limited,
even though the need for international cooperative measures to control
international environmental degradation, which respects no political
boundaries, has been apparent.81 Early transnational environmental
efforts found expression either in a limited number of diplomatic and
arbitral cases, 82 or in a number of weak international treaties in a lim-
ited area of conservation issues such as the protection of whales or
migratory birds.8 3
In managing international rivers, however, the maxim sic utere tuo
ut alienum non laedas (use your own property so as not to injure the
property of another) has been generally applied for a long time.84 By
the early 1970s, there were over twenty institutional arrangements and
over 300 bilateral conventions covering the rivers of the world.8 5
Also, by the late 1960s, a proliferation of bilateral, regional, and multi-
lateral conventions on several environmental issues, such as oil pollu-
tion on the high seas, nuclear transportation, waste disposal, river
pollution, endangered species, weather modification and trans-
boundary air pollution were negotiated.86 There was, however, little
coordinated effort to meet the global environmental challenge.
81. See generally UNEP, Environmental Law: An In-Depth Review 5-6 (UNEP Rep. No. 2,
1981) [hereinafter UNEP Rep. No. 2].
82. These include the 1938/1941 Trail Smelter Case(U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards
1905, 1965 (1949); Corfu Channel Case (Merits) (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, in which the
International Court of Justice stated a "general and well-recognized" principle of international
law under which it is "every State's obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for
acts contrary to the rights of other States." Id. at 22; 1954 Japanese Fisherman Case (U.S. re-
sponsibility for nuclear tests); 1957 Lake Lanoux Arbitration (French-Spanish river pollution
dispute); 1958 Pacific Tests Case (U.S. nuclear tests); 1961 Ciudad Juirez Case (U.S. responsibil-
ity for river pollution); and 1973 Nuclear Tests Case (France's responsibility in South Pacific).
For a detailed discussion, see Nanda, The Establishment of International Standards for Transna-
tional Environmental Injury, 60 IOWA L. REV. 1089, 1095-1101 (1979).
83. See UNEP Rep. No. 2, supra note 81, at 5.
84. See generally Nanda, Emerging Trends in the Use of International Law and Institutions
for the Management of International Water Resources, 6 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 239, 258-59
(1976).
85. See Developments in the Field of Natural Resources - Water, Energy and Minerals -
Technical Aspects of International River Basin Development, U.N. Doc. E/C.7/35 at 13 (1972).
86. See U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC./Info. 5, and Supp. 1-4.
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The first major international effort toward the 'ealization of effec-
tive mechanisms for global environmental management was under-
taken in 1972. The setting was the U.N. Conference on the Human
Environment, which met in Stockholm8 7 and was convened in re-
sponse to the need for coordination of the various national, bilateral,
regional, and multilateral environmental efforts. The conference re-
sulted in the formulation and approval of principles and recommenda-
tions to serve as guidelines for the future conduct of states in
environmental and developmental matters.88
Among the Principles contained in the Declaration of the Stock-
holm Conference, three are of special note. Principle 21 is a clear
enunciation of a state's "responsibility to ensure that activities within
... [its] jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environ-
ment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdic-
tion. ' '8 9 Principle 22 obligates states to cooperate in the further
development of international environmental law on "liability and com-
pensation" for victims of transnational pollution and other environ-
mental damage. Another Principle explicitly refers to the emission of
substances such as CFCs: "The discharge of toxic substances or of
other substances and the release of heat, in such quantities and con-
centrations as to exceed the capacity of the environment to render
them harmless, must be halted in order to ensure that serious or irre-
versible, damage is not inflicted upon ecosystems." 90
Several pertinent recommendations, especially those related to
"[i]dentification and control of pollutants of broad international signif-
icance," 91 are noteworthy. Governments are asked to "[c]arefully
evaluate the likelihood and magnitude of climatic effects and dissemi-
nate their findings to the maximum extent feasible before" undertak-
ing polluting activities, and to "[c]onsult fully other interested States
when activities carrying a risk of . . .effects [on climate] are being
contemplated or implemented. '92 Also, in another recommendation,
the international community is asked to support large-scale testing
programs "for evaluation of the environmental impact potential of
87. The report of the conference is contained in U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14/Rev. 1 (1973),
reprinted in 11 I.L.M 1416 (1972).
88. For the first ten years of UNEP activities, see Nanda & Moore, Global Management of
the Environment: Regional and Multilateral Initiatives, in WORLD CLIMATE CHANGE: THE
ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 93, 97-103 (V. Nanda'ed. 1983) [book here-
inafter cited as WORLD CLIMATE CHANGE].
89. For a thorough discussion of this Principle, see generally Sohn, The Stockholm Declara-
tion of the Human Environment, 14 HARV. J. INT'L L. 423, 485-93 (1973).
90. 11 I.L.M., supra note 87, Principle 6, at 1418.
91. See id. at 1449-53, Recommendations 70-85.
92. Id. at 1449, Recommendation 70.
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specific contaminants or products,"' 93 and a monitoring program to
study "long-term global trends in atmospheric constituents and
properties which may cause changes in meteorological properties, in-
cluding climatic changes." '94
For the purpose of the present study, the Stockholm Conference's
major contribution lies in providing a concrete expression to growing
international environmental concerns, which were vividly described in
the Club of Rome's controversial study, The Limits to Growth.g" The
Conference led to the establishment of permanent institutions, includ-
ing the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP),96 whose
task is to coordinate the various activities pertaining to the "Action
Plan" the Conference adopted, encompassing environmental assess-
ment, environmental management, and supporting measures. 97 It is
under the auspices of UNEP, which has acted as a catalyst, that inter-
national efforts have been mounted to address the ozone-depletion
problem.98
The Conference Principles and Recommendations spurred further
action by UNEP 99 and nations, 100 as well as regional organizations.' 0
In 1974, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) adopted principles concerning transfrontier air pollution,
which included the principles of notification and consultation; equal
access to foreign nationals to seek administrative and judicial remedies
93. Id. at 1450, Recommendation 74(d)(ii).
94. Id. at 1452, Recommendation 79(a).
95. See D.H. MEADOWS, D.L. MEADOWS, J. RANDERS, W. BEHRENS, THE LIMITS TO
GROWTH (Report to the Club of Rome, 1972). The study painted a grim picture of humanity's
future because of growing environmental degradation.
96. See G.A. Res. 2997, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 43, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972).
97. See 11 I.L.M., supra note 87, § II(A) at 1421. (Framework for the Action Plan for envi-
ronmental action.)
98. See, e.g., infra note 142 and accompanying text; and especially STRATOSPHERIC OZONE
DEPLETION AND CFCs, supra note 44, at 57 (statement of Dr. Mostafa K. Tolba, Executive
Director, UNEP).
99. See generally, Sand, Environmental Law in the United Nations Environment Programme,
in HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw/U.N. UNIVERSITY, THE FUTURE OF THE IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW OF THE ENVIRONMENT 51 (R. Dupuy ed. 1985).
100. See generally Ten Years After Stockholm - International Environmental Law, 77 PRoC.
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 411-35 (1983), especially id. at 412 (enhanced state interest in environmental
issues after Stockholm); Developments, The United Nations Environmental Programme After a
Decade. The Nairobi Session of a Special Character, May 1981, 12 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 269
(1983); Wood, The United Nations World Charter for Nature: The Developing Nations' Initiative
to Establish Protections of the Environment, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 977 (1985). For a recent survey of
environmental laws of a few selected countries in the EEC, Japan, and Mexico, see Smith &
Falzone, Foreign Environmental Legal Systems - A Brief Review, 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA)
Curr. Rep. at 621 (Nov. 9, 1988).
101. For example, in 1973, the European Economic Community adopted its own program of
action on the environment. See Declaration on the Environmental Action Program, 16 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. C 112) at 1 (1973), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 164 (1974).
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as to a state's subjects; and non-discrimination, requiring states to con-
trol transboundary pollution as stringently as pollution remaining
within the state.102 In 1979, the Economic Commission for Europe
(ECE) succeeded in achieving the adoption of the Convention on
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution at Geneva, 10 3 which obli-
gates contracting parties to consult upon request concerning activities
affecting or posing a "significant risk" of long-range transboundary air
pollution, and provides for information exchange and continued moni-
toring of pollutants, as well as collaborative research toward the objec-
tive of mitigating sulphur dioxide emissions. 104
The International Law Commission adopted in 1976 its Draft Ar-
ticles on State Responsibility. 0 5 One article lists the serious breach of
an international obligation of essential importance for the safeguard-
ing and preservation of the human environment, such as those prohib-
iting massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the seas, as an
international crime.'0 6 The Commission continues to develop rules of
international environmental law. 10 7 Among scholarly organizations,
the work of the International Law Association'0 8 and the American
Law Institute'0 9 deserve special mention.
102. See generally OECD, A TENTATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOME DATA CONCERNING LONG-
RANGE TRANSPORT OF AIR POLLUTANTS IN EUROPE 58 (1978), OECD Doc. ENV/TFP/78;
OECD, LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION (1977); OECD, THE POLLUTER
PAYS PRINCIPLE (1975); OECD, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES FOR THE 1980S (1980); OECD,
NON-DISCRIMINATION IN RELATION TO TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION: LEADING OECD DoC-
UMENTS 35 (1978) (on financing the monitoring and evaluation of air pollutants in Europe).
103. T.I.A.S. No. 10541 (November 13, 1979), reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1142 (1979).
104. See id. arts. 4-7, 9. See generally Wetstone & Rosencranz, Transboundary Air Pollution:
The Search for an International Response, 8 HARV. ENV'L L. REV. 89, 100-106 (1984).; Protocol
to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, on Financing the Moni-
toring and Evaluation of Air Pollutants in Europe, September 28, 1984, reprinted in 24 I.L.M.
484 (1985).
105. 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 170, U.N. Doc. A/31/10 (1976), reprinted in [1976] 2
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 73, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1976/Add.l.
106. Id. art. 19(3)(d).
107. It continues to work on the two topics it has had under consideration for many years:
"The Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Water Courses," and "International Lia-
bility For Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law."
See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-Ninth Session, 42 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 33, 89, U.N. Doc. A/42/10 (1987). See also McCaffrey, The Work of
the International Law Commission Relating to the Environment, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 189 (1983);
McCaffrey, An Update on the Contributions of the International Law Commission to International
Environmental Law, 15 ENV'L L. 667 (1985).
108. See, e.g., Legal Aspects of Long-Distance Air Pollution, in INTERNATIONAL LAW Asso-
CIATION, REPORT OF THE SIXTY-SECOND CONFERENCE (SEOUL) 198 (1987); and Water Re-
sources Law in id. 231.
109. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES Pt. VI (1987), especially § 601(1). See also id. § 601(2), comment e; § 601 re-
porter's note no. I (general principles of state responsibility for environmental injury), no. 4
(obligation to notify and consult), and no. 9 (impact abroad upon the "global commons"). See
id. § 602 (remedies for violation of environmental obligations.).
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The major significance of the recent developments is that, in addi-
tion to the establishment of substantive norms of international envi-
ronmental law on specific issues such as transboundary air
pollution, 110 marine pollution,11' and utilization of international wa-
ters, 112 several procedural norms have emerged, which have been gain-
ing general acceptance. These include a state's duty to cooperate, to
notify, to exchange information, to consult and negotiate regarding
activities on its territory which may have extraterritorial environmen-
tal effects,113 and the emerging regime of equal right of access and
non-discrimination under OECD guidelines.' 14
IV. EVENTS LEADING TO THE 1985 VIENNA CONVENTION AND
THE 1987 MONTREAL PROTOCOL
The 1974 report by Molina and Rowland on the destruction of
ozone by CFCs1 5 was followed by two reports released by the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences (NAS) in September 1976 on the emis-
sions of chlorofluoromethanes and the associated health and biological
effects of such emissions. 1 6 The NAS sounded an ominous warning:
110. See notes 102-104 supra and accompanying text.
111. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES §§ 603-604 (1987); U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, at
arts. 192-237, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) and The Law Of the Sea, Official Text of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with Annexes and Index (U.N. Sales No. E.83
V.5 (1983); Nanda, Protection of the Internationally Shared Environment and the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, in CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION: THE UNITED STATES
AND THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 403 (J. Van Dyke ed. 1985).
112. See supra notes 84-85, 107 and accompanying text.
113. In addition to notes 102-109 supra, see generally OECD, OECD AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT 106-26 (1979); G.A. Res. 2995, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) 42 (1972); U.N. Doc. A/
CN. 4/402, para. 14 (1986)(Report of J. Barboza to the International Law Commission.); U.N.
Survey of State Practice Relevant to International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising
Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law 180-182, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/384 (1984);
Bothe, Transfrontier Environmental Management, in INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR CONSERVA-
TION OF NATURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, TRENDS IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND
LAW 391 (1980); OECD, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON WATER MANAGEMENT
POLICIES AND INSTRUMENTS, Paris, Apr. 5, 1978, No. 7, OECD Doc. C. (78) 4 (Final); Bothe,
International Legal Problems of Industrial Siting in Border Areas and National Environmental
Policies, in OECD, TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION AND THE ROLE OF STATES 79, 85-92, 95-97
(1981).
114. See, e.g., OECD, Recommendation of the Council for Implementation of Regime of
Equal Right of Access and Non-Discrimination in Relation to Transfrontier Pollution, May 17,
1977, OECD Doc. C. (77) 28 (Final (1977) (see especially Annex, Introduction, sub-para. (a));
OECD, OECD AND THE ENVIRONMENT 115-16 (1979); OECD, 1974 Recommendation for
Equal Right of Access in Relation to Transfrontier Pollution, OECD Doc. C (76) 55 (1976); Scan-
dinavian Convention on the Protection of the Environment, 1974, art. 11, reprinted in 13 I.L.M.
591, 595 (1974).
115. See supra note 26.
116. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES (NAS), HALOCARBONS: EFFECTS ON STRATO-
SPHERIC OZONE (1976); NAS, HALOCARBONS: ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF
CHLOROFLUOROMETHANE RELEASES (1976).
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"Selective regulation of CFM uses and releases is almost certain to be
necessary at some time and to some degree of completeness." ' 1 7 How-
ever, the study noted that at that time "[n]either the needed timing or
the needed severity can be reasonably specified." 18 The following
month, several U.S. federal agencies announced a proposed reduction
over the next 18 months in the uses of certain CFCs in aerosol
sprays. 19
The NAS followed its 1976 studies by two more studies in 1979120
and several more in the 1980s.' 21 The message was clear that contin-
ued use of CFCs could cause substantial depletion of ozone. The
United States Environmental Protection Agency issued in October
1980 an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, which discussed
the subject of an immediate freeze on the production of some CFCs
and the possibility of using a system of marketable permits for the
allocation of CFC consumption among those industries which use
CFCs. 12 2
It is important to note that the United States was not alone in con-
ducting the studies, sounding the warning, and taking some action.
Others engaged in such activities were primarily the European states,
which individually and also in agreements with other states, acted to
regulate the use of CFCs. 123
Internationally, UNEP and WMO took the initiative and actively
pursued the issue starting in the early 1980s, conducting studies and a
series of workshops.' 24 Negotiations to resolve differences between the
117. NAS, HALOCARBONS: ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF CHLOROFLUOROMETHANE RE-
LEASES 7 (1976).
118. Id.
119. See STRATOSPHERIC OZONE DEPLETION & CFCs, supra. note 44, at 63, 66 (statement
of F. Sherwood Rowland in which he notes this development). For the U.S. action banning the
use of CFCs in aerosols by 1978, see Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629
(1976).
120. See NAS, PROTECTION AGAINST DEPLETION OF STRATOSPHERE OZONE BY
CHLOROFLUORCARBONS (1979); NAS, STRATOSPHERIC OZONE DEPLETION BY HALOCARBONS:
CHEMISTRY AND TRANSPORT (1979).
121. See NAS, CHANGING CLIMATE (1983); NAS, CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN
STRATOSPHERIC OZONE: UPDATE 1983 (1984). For an important study by NASA, see 1986
ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 14. Another study of note is by EPA, see OZONE TRENDS
PANEL REPORT, supra note 1.
122. See 45 Fed. Reg. 66,726 (1980).
123. See, e.g., Weiss, A Resource Management Approach to Carbon Dioxide During the Cen-
tury of Transition, in WORLD CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 88, at 167, 184-85; Agreement
Among the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, 27 U.S.T. 1437, T.I.A.S. No. 8255,
reprinted in I Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) § 21: 2501 [1978 Reference File]; Sand, Protecting the
Ozone Layer. The Vienna Convention is Adopted, ENVIRONMENT, June 1985, at 18, 41.
124. See generally UNEP Rep. No. 2, supra note 81, at 15; UNEP, Program Performance
Report - Addendum, UNEP/GC. 10/5 Add. 2, at 2-4 (Dec.7, 1981); UNEP, Nowhere to Hide,
in STRATOSPHERIC OZONE DEPLETION AND.CFCs, supra note 44, at 57 (statement by Dr. Mos-
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United States, which sought stricter controls, and several of its trading
partners, which favored more lax standards and controls,
125
culminated in the adoption of the 1985 Vienna Convention and the
1987 Montreal Protocol.
V. THE 1985 VIENNA CONVENTION AND NEGOTIATIONS
TOWARD THE 1987 MONTREAL PROTOCOL
Eventually, in March 1985, a diplomatic conference adopted the
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer. 126 Recal-
ling Principle 21 of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment
and the World Plan of Action on the Ozone Layer of UNEP, 127 the
Convention promotes global cooperation necessary to protect the
ozone layer. It established a framework for concerted action in the
future, while limiting itself to providing general measures for interna-
tional cooperation in research, monitoring, and information exchange.
No concrete obligations were undertaken by states to limit the produc-
tion or use of chemicals that deplete ozone, but the Convention envis-
aged further negotiations and adoption of necessary international
regulatory measures in the future.
Thus, although the Convention did not specify strategies, the par-
ties would be obligated to cooperate in several ways: (1) to adopt ap-
propriate legislative and administrative measures; (2) "in harmonizing
appropriate policies to control," limit, reduce, or prevent human activ-
ities under their jurisdiction or control that adversely affect the ozone
layer; (3) "in the formulation of agreed [implementation] measures,
tafa K. Tolba, Executive Director, UNEP) [hereinafter Nowhere to Hide]; Sand, supra note 123,
at 40-43; UNEP/GC. 8/70 (Apr. 29, 1980); UNEP/GC. 13/16 (1985); Benedick, International
Cooperation to Protect the Ozone Layer, 86 DEP'T ST. BULL., June 1986, at 58; Benedick, Protect-
ing the Ozone Layer, 85 id., Apr. 1985, at 63; M. TOLBA, THE STATE OF THE WORLD ENVIRON-
MENT: THE 1980 REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED NATIONS
ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM (1980); The State of the World Environment, 1972-1982, UNEP/GC
(SSC)/INF. 2 (Jan. 29, 1982); Taubes & Chen, Made In The Shade?, DISCOVER, Aug. 1987, at
62; World Meteorological Organization, Atmospheric Ozone.- 1985 - Assessment of Our Under-
standing of the Processes Controlling Its Present Disruption and Change (Global Ozone and Mon-
itoring Project, Rep. No. 16, 1986); Wasermann, UNEP: Protection of the Ozone Layer, 17 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 182 (1983).
125. UNEP's legal adviser, Rummel-Bulaska, discusses the negotiations leading to the adop-
tion of the convention in Rummel-Bulaska, The Protection of the Ozone Layer Under the Global
Framework Convention, in TRANSIOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION 281 (C. Flinterman ed. 1986).
See also UNEP, Nowhere to Hide, supra note 124; Benedick, International Cooperation to Protect
the Ozone Layer, supra note 124; Sand, supra note 123, at 41-42; Lang, Environmental Protection
- The Challenge for International Law, 19 J. WORLD TRADE L. 489, 492 (1985); 10 Int'l Env't
Rep. (BNA), Curr. Rep. 195-96 (May 13, 1987); id. at 273 (June 10, 1987); id. at 315-16 (July 8,
1987); id. at 451 (Sept. 9, 1987).
126. See generally Vienna Ozone Convention, supra note 20; UNEP, U.N. Doc. UNEP/IG
53/3,4 and 5/Rev. 1 (1985).
127. See Vienna Ozone Convention, supra note 20, preamble.
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procedures, and standards;" and (4) "with competent international
bodies to implement effectively this Convention and protocols to
which they are party."'128 The parties also undertook the obligation
"to initiate and cooperate in, directly or through competent interna-
tional bodies, the conduct of research and scientific assessments" on
processes that may affect the ozone layer and on effects of modifica-
tions of the ozone layer. 129 Similarly, the parties agreed to promote or
establish joint or complementary programs "for systematic observa-
tion of the state of the ozone layer," and to cooperate "in ensuring the
collection, validation and transmission of research and observational
data ... in a regular and timely fashion."' 30
Other obligations include those to cooperate in the legal, scientific,
and technical fields,131 and to transmit pertinent information on the
measures adopted by them in implementation of the Convention 32 to
the Conference of the Parties, which was established under the Con-
vention. 33 The Convention also established a secretariat 34 and a dis-
pute-settlement procedure, which includes negotiation, good offices,
mediation, and conciliation, but does not obligate parties to resort to
arbitration or litigation before the International Court of Justice if a
settlement is not reached through negotiation or mediation. 35
Although the Convention failed to provide for controls on the
manufacture or use of ozone-depleting chemicals, it was a promising
first step, for it signified recognition by the world community that it
must act promptly on this environmental challenge before the occur-
rence of any actual damage. The remarks of Dr. Mostafa K. Tolba,
the Executive Director of UNEP are pertinent:
This is the first global convention to address an issue that for the time
being seems far in the future and is of unknown proportions. This Con-
vention, as I see it, is the essence of the anticipatory response so many
environmental issues call for: to deal with the threat of the problem
before we have to deal with the problem itself.136
The period between the signing of the Vienna Convention and the
adoption of the Montreal Protocol was still marked by a continuing
128. Id., art. 2, para.2.
129. Id., art. 3, para.1.
130. Id., art. 3, paras. 2-3.
131. Id., art. 4.
132. Id., art. 5.
133. Id., art. 6.
134. Id., art. 7.
135. Id., art. 11.
136. Excerpt from Dr. Tolba's statement at the Vienna Convention, reprinted in Sand, supra
note 123, at 20.
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debate on whether CFCs and trace gases are responsible for the deple-
tion of ozone or if such depletion could be attributed to natural atmos-
pheric variations. 137 Those believing in the dynamical theory of the
ozone hole, continued to argue that there was still uncertainty about
the effects of the chlorine in the stratosphere. 138 In the meantime,
studies and further negotiations continued. 139 At a Senate hearing in
May 1987, David Doniger, Senior Attorney at the Natural Resources
Defence Counsel stated:
We should all remember that the 95% phase-down policy [for CFCs and
2 halons in 10-14 years] was developed on the basis of a broad scientific
analysis, but without taking into account such phenomena as the passive
and unexpected Antarctic ozone hole. As Ambassador Richard Bene-
dick [chief U.S. negotiator] stated at a CFC conference on March 25,
"[w]e have simply excluded that disturbing phenomenon from our equa-
tions." Now, however, scientists from the National Ozone Expedition
who have directly investigated the causes of the Antarctic hole have tes-
tified that it is probably linked to CFCs. While many scientific issues
remain to be explored, these developments reinforce an inevitability of
the 95% phase-down policy for policymakers with any sense of prudence
in the face of potentially catastrophic global consequences. 40
Earlier, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) released a
report in 1986 on an assessment of the risks of stratospheric modifica-
tion. 41 Eventually, UNEP's efforts, with active participation and sup-
port of the United States, succeeded as the negotiations culminated in
the adoption of the Montreal Protocol. 14 2
VI. THE 1987 MONTREAL PROTOCOL
On September 16, 1987, 24 states signed the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, which expanded the pur-
pose of the Vienna Convention by upholding a state's obligation "to
137. See generally Taubes & Chen, supra note 124, at 68-69.
138. See, e.g., STRATOSPHERIC OZONE DEPLETION AND CFCs, supra note 44, at 36-37
(statement of Dr. Adrian Tuck, Environmental Research Laboratories, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce).
139. See Nowhere to Hide, supra note 124; STRATOSPHERIC OZONE DEPLETION AND CFCs,
supra note 44, at 472 (statement of Lee M. Thomas, administrator EPA), 475 (statement of
Richard Benedick, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environment, Health, and Natural Resources,
Department of State), 477 (statement of Anthony Calio, Undersecretary of Commerce for
Oceans and the Atmosphere, Department of Commerce); EPA, EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN
STRATOSPHERIC OZONE AND GLOBAL ILIMATE (1986); Benedick, International Efforts To Pro-
tect the Stratospheric Ozone Layer, CURRENT POLICY No. 931 (U.S. Dep't State, Mar. 1987);
note 272 infra.
140. STRATOSPHERIC OZONE DEPLETION AND CFCs, supra note 44, at 431, 433-34.
141. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RISKS OF
STRATOSPHERIC MODIFICATION (Office of Air and Radiation 1986).
142. See Negroponte, Montreal Protocoh Controlling Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, 87 DEP'T ST. BULL., Dec. 1987, at 60, 61-62; infra note 210.
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take appropriate measures to protect human health and the environ-
ment against adverse effects resulting or likely to result from human
activities which modify or are likely to modify the ozone
layer.[emphasis added]" 143 The recognition of scientific uncertainty,
reflected in the phrases "likely to result" and "likely to modify,"
strengthens the position that action must be taken to avert a continu-
ance of ozone depletion. The basis for such action must be the present
state of scientific knowledge, with sufficient flexibility to change if dic-
tated by future scientific data.1"4
It should be noted at the outset that the Protocol does not place
limits on each of the controlled substances that are specified in it. It
does place a separate limit on the total ozone depletion caused by
Group I (five types of CFCs) and II (three types of halons) controlled
substances 45 that a state party may produce and consume. It leaves
up to each party how to stay within those limits.
A. Control Measures Under the Protocol
The Protocol states that as of July 1, 1989 (following the needed
ratifications), annual levels of a party's production 46 and consump-
tion 47 of controlled substances in Group I shall not exceed a party's
143. Montreal Protocol, supra note 21, Preamble (emphasis added to highlight the addition
to the Preamble of the Vienna Convention) [hereinafter Protocol].
144. See id., art. 2, paras. 9-10, art. 6 (sufficient flexibility is provided).
145. TABLE I
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
Group I Substances Ozone Depleting Potential*
CFCI3 (CFC-11) 1.0
CFCL, (CFC- 12) 1.0
C2F3CL3 (CFC-1 13) 0.8
CF 4CI2 (CFC-114) 1.0
C2FCI (CFC-115) 0.6
Group II Substances
CF 2BrCI (halon-1211) 3.0
CF 3Br (halon-1301) 10.0
C2F4Br 2 (halon-2402) (to be determined)
These ozone depleting potentials are estimates based on
existing knowledge and will be reviewed and revised period.
ically.
Id. Annex A.
Different CFCs have different ozone depletion levels. CFC- I I and -12 have been assigned an
ozone depletion level of 1.0. All other controlled substances have an ozone depletion level that
corresponds with CFC-I 1 and -12 depletion levels. Thus a level less than 1.0 would have lower
depletion effect than CFC- 11 or -12.
146. This is the amount of controlled substances produced minus the amount destroyed by
approved technologies. Id., art. 1, para. 5.




1986 level of production and consumption of Group I substances.1 48
Two major exceptions exist. One exception allows up to a 10 percent
increase in production, based upon 1986 levels, to satisfy the basic do-
mestic needs of developing countries operating under article 5 of the
Protocol. The other exception allows for a 10 percent increase above
1986 production levels for the purposes of "industrial rationaliza-
tion" 149 between Parties. "Industrial rationalization" is an economic.
solution which would allow one party to transfer some or all of its
level of production to another party to achieve economic ,efficiency or
to meet anticipated shortfalls in supply because of plant closures.
Thus, if one party does not use all of its controlled substances produc-
tion allotment, that party may sell its rights to produce the controlled
substances to another party which may have already reached its pro-
duction level for the controlled substances for a particular year, and
which wants to produce more.
It seems essential that the parties must determine the needed
mechanisms for implementing industrial rationalization through a
subsequent agreement within a short time after the Protocol enters
into force. It is not desirable or appropriate to leave it to the economic
marketplace to determine what controlled substances are produced,
because a supply and demand mechanism is not concerned with, nor
will it reflect, potential environmental impacts (external costs) which
may result in a "tragedy of the commons."
An even more serious problem is that of setting production and
consumption levels at 1986 base levels. Given the nature of our cur-
rent scientific understanding, it seems clear that maintenance of such
high levels (as existed in 1986) of production and consumption will
allow the depletion levels to continue to increase well into the 21st
century, with all of their potential deleterious effects. Moreover, how
will the accuracy of the 1986 base year levels that each party has de-
termined for itself be verified? Calculation and verification of 1986
control baseline levels will be difficult if accurate records are not avail-
able, thus adding uncertainty, because a party with a higher baseline
would be economically better off than a party which sacrificed higher
production levels. Also, the same verification and calculation
problems may result every year when an accounting of production,
consumption, export and import levels must be reported. 50
As of July 1993, annual levels of production and consumption of
148. Id., art. 2, para. 1.
149. Id., art. 1, para. 8.
150. Id., art. 7.
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Group I controlled substances must not exceed 80 percent of a party's
6 levels of production and consumption. 151 Thus within five and one
half years, Group I production and consumption levels must be re-
duced by only 20 percent of 6 baseline levels. The same percent poten-
tial production increase exceptions for domestic needs of developing
countries and for industrial rationalization apply. These exceptions
could further reduce the meager reductions that are to be instituted.
As of July 1, 1998, annual levels of production and consumption of
controlled substances in Group I may not exceed 50 percent of a
party's 1986 levels for Group I substances.1 52 A 15 percent increase in
production (over the 50 percent level) is allowed to satisfy the basic
domestic needs of developing nations or for industrial rationalization.
Thus, maximum world reductions in Group I substances will only be
between 35 and 50 percent. Since our present scientific knowledge
tells us that an immediate 85 percent of controlled substance usage is
needed just to keep matters from worsening, the proposed reductions
do not seem to be adequate to help reduce the present or future rates
of ozone depletion. Furthermore, a two-thirds majority of the con-
suming parties can vote to eliminate this entire provision from the
Protocol so that the 1993 levels would be the maximum reductions
deemed necessary under this Protocol. 153
Other exceptions to these levels of production include allowing a
party whose 1986 level of production is less than twenty-five kilotons,
for purposes of industrial rationalization, to transfer or receive pro-
duction abilities in excess of the limits set for Group I substances dur-
ing any time period, provided that the total combined production
levels between parties do not exceed applicable production limits. 54
The language of this provision is ambiguous and could theoretically
result in defeating or at least diluting the purpose of this Protocol. To
illustrate, a developed country, such as the United Kingdom, could
acquire the production rights of a developing country, such as Ghana,
151. Id., art. 2, para. 3.
152. Id., art. 2, para. 4.
153. Id.
154. Id., art. 2, para. 5. Except for developing countries covered in Article 5, any Party
which has contracted for or is constructing facilities to produce controlled substances prior to
September 16, 1987, and has provided for the same in national legislation prior to January 1,
1987, may add the production capability from such facilities to its 1986 production base level,
provided that such facilities are completed by December 31, 1990, and that such production does
not raise a Party's annual level of consumption of the controlled substances above 0.5 kilograms
per capita. This provision seems to cater to special interests, such as the Soviet Union and other
countries with planned economies, so that a nation's or industry's initial investment of financing
new production facilities is not lost. It could, however, lead to increases in production capability,
which is not what the Protocol is designed to do.
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to produce more CFCs than its allotted quota, so long as the total did
not exceed applicable production limits of these two countries. Also,
if the United Kingdom decided not to produce CFCs any more, it
could transfer its quota to Ghana. Other exceptions involve facilities
under construction or contract for production of controlled sub-
stances,15" and the manner of implementation of the Protocol by states
members of regional economic organizations, such as the European
Economic Community. 156
As of February 1, 1992, annual levels of production and consump-
tion of controlled substances in Group II are not to exceed a party's
1986 levels of production and consumption of Group H substances. 157
The same exceptions exist for Group H as for Group I substances (up
to a percent increase for both basic domestic need of developing na-
tions and industrial'rationalization). The stated objections applicable
to Group I are also applicable here, with some additions. Is it really
necessary or desirable to wait an additional two and a half years just to
implement the 1986 baseline for production and consumption of
Group H controlled substances, which have a much higher ozone de-
pletion potential? This only delays the creation and implementation of
alternatives to Group H substances. Furthermore, no additional de-
creases in production or consumption of Group H substances are dic-
tated in the Protocol. Even though Group HI substances are not
produced and consumed at the rate of Group I controlled substances,
more severe reductions are needed to reduce future risks of ozone
depletion.
B. Production Adjustments to the Protocol
The Protocol provides for the parties to determine whether further
adjustments 158 and reductions in production and consumption of the
155. Id., art. 2, para. 6. According to the provision, except for developing countries covered
in Article 5, any Party which has contracted for or is constructing facilities to produce controlled
substances prior to September 16, 1987, and has provided for the same in national legislation
prior to January 1, 1987, may add the production capability from such facilities to its 1986
production base level, provided that such facilities are completed by December 31, 1990, and that
such production does not raise a Party's annual level of consumption of the controlled substances
above 0.5 kilograms per capita. This provision seems to cater to special interests, such as the
Soviet Union and other countries with planned economies, so that a nation's or industry's initial
investment of financing new production facilities is not lost. It could, however, lead to increases
in production capability, which is not what the Protocol is designed to do.
156. Id., art. 2, para. 8.
157. Id., art. 2, para. 2.
158. Article 6 of the Protocol requires that as of 1990 and every four years thereafter, the
Parties will meet to assess the control measures and to determine progress in controlling ozone
depletion. It is hoped that further reductions can be made at such meetings that will more
effectively deal with the problems at hand.
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controlled substances is deemed necessary. 5 9 It is important that the
Protocol allows for further cuts in the future. As other nations fully
understand the adverse consequences of this limited action approach
to the ozone depletion problem or if science comes up with an even
stronger cause-effect connection, it will be necessary to modify' 6° the
Protocol as required.
If all efforts at consensus have failed, an adjustment or modifica-
tion may be adopted by a two-thirds majority vote of the parties that
are present at such a meeting if the parties represent at least 50 percent
of the total consumption of the controlled substances of all parties.' 61
Such a decision would be binding upon all parties. Perhaps it would
have been better if the "50 percent total consumption" was replaced
by "50 percent of the total production" to ensure cooperation among
producing countries to abide by the new adjustments if a reduction
were required.
C. Unilateral Measures
The Protocol appropriately provides that parties may take more
stringent measures than those required under it.162 This is, however,
unlikely for economic reasons. Unless all parties equally share the
burdens of reduced production and consumption, some nations may
wish to gain short-term profits by limiting their efforts to the levels
specified in the Protocol, instead of instituting more severe
restrictions.
D. Developing Nations
The Protocol recognizes that developing nations are not economi-
cally in a good position to make many sacrifices. Thus, it provides a
grace period of ten years for the compliance of developing nations,
which are identified as those whose annual level of consumption of
controlled substances is less than 0.3 kilograms per capita on or before
January 1, 1999. 163 The only limitation is that the developing nation's
consumption level is not to exceed 0.3 kilograms per capita.
In order to try to reduce the need to produce such substances, the
parties are to attempt to make alternative substances, technology, and
i59. See id., art. 2, para. 9.
160. This may require removing a controlled substance from the controlled list if it is found
not to be a potential cause of ozone depletion. Two-thirds majority vote of present Parties would
be needed for such a modification. Id., art. 2, para. 10.
161. See id.
162. Id., art. 2, para. 11.
163. See id., art. 5.
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subsidies aid available to developing nations. 164 It is true that develop-
ing nations have a lesser impact in production and consumption of
controlled substances, but this exception still allows for significant
growth rates in controlled substances production. It is noteworthy
that among developing countries, India did not participate in the con-
ference,' 65 and the People's Republic of China did not sign the Proto-
col, although it did participate in the conference.166 It is imperative
that these two most populous countries equally share the concern of
the developed countries about ozone depletion and become parties to
the Montreal Protocol. 67
E. Import/Export Restrictions
By January 1, 1990, each party must ban the import of controlled
substances from any state not a Party to the 1987 Protocol. 168 This is
important because import restrictions strengthen the Protocol and
provide a disincentive for present producers of controlled substances
to refuse to sign it.
By January 1, 1993, no party may export any controlled substances
to a state not a party to the 1987 Protocol; parties are also discouraged
from exporting technology to non-parties which is useful for utilizing
controlled'substances. 69 These provisions also provide an incentive
for a state to sign the Protocol, especially if it is dependent upon for-
eign CFC production.
The Protocol further provides that by January 1, 1992, the Parties
are to list products that contain controlled substances and ban their
import within a year after that from any State that is not a Party to the
1987 Protocol. 70 This will further prevent nations from profiting by
not being a part of the controlled substances reductions specified in the
Protocol. Additionally, by January 1, 1994, the Parties are to deter-
mine the feasibility of banning or restricting, from States not Parties to
the 1987 Protocol, the import of products produced with but not con-
164. Id., art. 5, paras. 2-3.
165. See Weisskopf, Nations Sign Agreement to Guard Ozone Layer, Wash. Post, Sept. 17,
1987, § A, at 2, cols. 4, 6.
166. Id.
167. In early March 1989, over 120 countries met in a three-day conference on the protection
of the ozone layer, convened by the British government in London from March 5-7. The purpose
was to persuade non-parties to become parties to the Protocol. See Fin. Times (London), March
4, 1989, at 5; Whitney, London Talks Hear Call for '97 Ban on Anti-Ozone Chemicals, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 6, 1989, at BI, col. 1.
168. Montreal Protocol, supra note 21, art. 4, para. 1.
169. See id., art. 4, paras. 2, 5.
170. Id., art. 4, para. 3.
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taining controlled substances.1 71 The Parties are also to refrain from
financing exports to non-Parties of "products, equipments, plants, or
technology that would facilitate the production of controlled
substances." 1 72
Economic disincentives or penalties such as trade restrictions can
be highly persuasive tools for convincing nations to join the Protocol.
The greatest reduction, within reason, in controlled chemical usage
would be beneficial and should be encouraged. This will also en-
courage development of substitute processes so that controlled sub-
stances are no longer used in the manufacturing process. However,
the development of substitutes which it is hoped will alleviate the cur-
rent industrial dependence on controlled substances and effectively re-
duce their production, will itself depend upon the development of
appropriate new technologies. Recent reports by the industry an-
nouncing the introduction of such technologies to develop substitutes
for CFCs as well as to develop devices to capture and remove CFCs
from automotive air conditioning systems, show great promise. 73
F. Noncompliance
The Protocol requires that at their first meeting, presumably by
January 1990, the parties must approve procedures and institutional
mechanisms for determining noncompliance and treatment of
noncompliant parties. 74
In discussing compliance in the international arena, one must con-
front several special challenges. First, who has jurisdiction to hear
compliance standards. Second, who has jurisdiction to hear compli-
ance matters? The Protocol's predecessor, the 1985 Vienna Conven-
tion, states that parties engaged in disputes concerning the Convention
(or subsequent protocols to the Convention) shall first seek solution by
negotiation. 75 If a negotiated settlement is not reached, the parties
may jointly seek the good offices of or request mediation by a third
party. 176 A party may also declare in writing that, for a dispute not
171. Id., art. 4, para. 4.
172. Id., art. 4, para. 6.
173. See, e.g., 11 Int'l Env't. Rep. (BNA), 520 (Oct. 12, 1988) (CFC producers announce
their replacement plans for CFCs); id. at 158 (March 9, 1988) (a joint statement by several U.K.
companies on CFC phaseout and replacements); id. at 109 (Feb. 10, 1988) (announcement on a
substitute for CFC- 113); id. at 667 (Dec. 14, 1988) (announcement on the removal of coolants
from automotive air conditioning systems); Koenig, Carbide Says New Chemicals Can Wean
Foam Makers From Chlorofluorocarbons, Wall St. J., Aug. 5, 1988, at 26, col. 5 (announcement
on developing chemicals which will allow manufacturers to produce foam without using CFCs).
174. Montreal Protocol, supra note 21, art. 8.
175. Vienna Convention, supra note 20, art. 11, para. I.
176. Id., art. 11, para. 2.
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resolved by negotiation or mediation, it accepts compulsory arbitra-
tion as a means of dispute settlement.1 77 Alternatively, the dispute
may be submitted to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).178 If
neither arbitration nor ICJ jurisdiction is agreed to by the parties in-
volved, a Conciliation Commission is to be created upon the request of
one of the parties to the dispute, whose "final and recommendatory
award" the parties must consider in good faith.1 79 The Vienna Con-
vention provisions, which apply to the Montreal Protocol as well by
reference,1 80 aptly encompass a workable compulsory dispute settle-
ment mechanism. This is a welcome development in the face of a gen-
eral reluctance to the acceptance of third-party decisionmaking in the
international arena.
The second challenge pertains to standing. It is desirable that both
states and nationals have standing to redress compliance issues result-
ing from the 1987 Protocol. This would insure the most effective en-
forcement of the Protocol because citizen enforcement actions would
augment governmental actions to protect the ozone layer.
The third and most formidable challenge relates to the selection of
remedies. The problems with the use of equitable or injunctive powers
of an international commission are obvious in the international arena
which is characterized by a horizontal structure. However, the parties
can certainly draw upon the prior experience of regional and bilateral
commissions on air and water issues18 1 and, despite a poor record thus
far of the development of international environmental law on liability
and compensation,' 8 2 they should address an attempt to resolve the
issue of providing credible remedies.
G. Research
The Protocol requires the parties to cooperate in promoting re-
search, development, and exchange of information pertaining to "the
containment, recovery, recycling, or destruction of controlled sub-
stances. " 183 It also calls upon the parties to promote public awareness
of the environmental effects of ozone-depletion issues.184 An interna-
177. Id., art. 11, para. 3(a).
178. Id., art. 11, para. 3(b).
179. Id., art. 11, paras. 4-5.
180. See id., art. 11, para. 6; see also Montreal Protocol, supra note 21, art. 14.
181. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 123, at 171-76; Parnall & Utton, The Senegal Valley Author-
ity: A Unique Experiment in International River Basin Planning, 51 IND. L.J. 235 (1976).
182. See, e.g., Nanda & Bailey, Export of Hazardous Waste and Hazardous Technologies:
Challenge for International Environmental Law, 17 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 157 (1988).
183. Montreal Protocol, supra note 21, art. 9. para. 1.
184. Id., art. 9, para. 2.
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tional research fund must be established to facilitate the fulfillment of
parties' obligations under the Protocol, possibly by requiring contribu-
tions of a percentage of a party's production and consumption levels.
The fund would be used to help develop alternatives to controlled sub-
stances and the use of better technology for improving containment,
recovery, recycling, and destruction of controlled substances. Such a
fund would ensure that some steps were being taken to develop new
ways to solve the ozone depletion problem. This is likely to prompt
states to act or to at least fund research activities.
H. Appraisal
Although there is merit to the criticism that the Protocol has failed
to more decisively act in accord with scientific evidence, and conse-
quently that little meaningful change will occur in an effort to stop the
depletion of stratospheric ozone by the year 2000,185 the following
analysis will show that the Protocol is an important and promising,
albeit small step, toward an international commitment to rectify the
ozone depletion problem. Although much more needs to be done
now, 186 perhaps no "tougher" agreement could have been reached in
September 1987.
The Protocol is a landmark in the ongoing development of interna-
tional environmental law, primarily because the world community
showed a rare consensus in accepting the imposition of strict controls
on states for activities potentially harmful but having caused no
proven specific damage or harm. As Mostafa Tolba said after the
adoption of the Protocol, "[n]ever before in the history of science and
law has the international community agreed to take such radical steps
to avert a problem they anticipate, before that problem has begun to
take its toll."1' ' 7 Another major strength of the Protocol lies in its
formula on its entry into force,' 88 and its provisions on review and
amendment. 189
First, the Protocol recognizes the special interest of the European
185. See, e.g., 10 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA), 581, 582 (Nov. 11, 1987) (statement of F. Sher-
wood Rowland, who first linked chlorine with depletion of stratospheric ozone).
186. See, e.g., THE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSTITUTE/INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH, SAVING OUR SKINS: TECHNICAL POTENTIAL AND POLICIES
FOR THE ELIMINATION OF OZONE-DEPLETING CHEMICAL COMPOUNDS (Sept. 1988) (the report
recommends a phase out of CFCs and other chlorine compounds not covered under the Protocol
by the end of the century).
187. Cited in Menyasz, International Agreement to Protect the Ozone Layer Hailed as Prece-
dent for Global Environmental Solutions, 10 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA), 531 (Oct. 14, 1987).
188. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 21, art. 16.
189. See id. at arts. 2(a), 6.
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Economic Community to be treated as a distinct entity, capable of
becoming a party in its own right. Prolonged negotiations led to a
resolution of the initial objection by the United States that it would set
a "dangerous international precedent." 190
Second, it ensures that states becoming parties are not likely to
face unfair competition from non-parties to the Protocol by requiring
ratification or accession by at least eleven states and international eco-
nomic entities (such as the EEC), representing two-thirds of global
consumption of CFCs and halons.
Third, it appropriately mandates compliance by the parties, with-
out reservations, with the Protocol's control measures, as well as with
its restrictions on trade with non-parties.' 9'
Fourth, the Protocol allows special treatment for developing coun-
tries, 192 and those with planned economies. 93 The objective, obvi-
ously, is to seek wider participation, but there is an inherent danger
that these exceptions, in addition to those on controlling trade with
non-parties, 94 are dysfunctional.
Finally, the Protocol provisions on review and amendment' 95 al-
low the parties to revise their control measure by adding new com-
pounds or changing emissions reductions in response to further
research and scientific evidence. 196
Ironically, as the following analysis shows, the Protocol is also se-
riously flawed because its control measures are inadequate to accom-
plish the Protocol's objective of halting ozone depletion. It is
noteworthy that current scientific evidence has now convinced two
persons highly influential in the formulation of the Protocol control
measures, UNEP's Executive Director Mostafa Tolba 197 and EPA
Administrator Lee Thomas, 98 that a strengthening of the Protocol is
essential to achieve a decrease in the stratospheric chlorine levels. In
October 1988, Tolba told a UNEP conference on the protection of the
ozone layer that the scientists studying the problem had concluded
that at least an 85 percent emissions reduction, instead of the 50 per-
cent reduction called for under the Protocol, is necessary to reduce the
190. See Menyasz, supra note 187, at 533.
191. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 21, at arts. 16-18.
192. See id. at arts. 2-5, 16-19.
193. See id. at art. 2, para. 6.
194. See id. at art. 4.
195. See id. art. 2(a)(10).
196. Id.
197. 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA), 581, 582-83 (Nov. 9. 1988).
198. Id. at 555, 556 (Oct. 12, 1988).
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levels of atmospheric chlorine to the level of twenty years ago.199
There are other problems with the control measures. The Protocol
does not control emissions of two other ozone-destroying chemicals,
methyl chloroform and carbon tetrachloride, which reportedly ac-
count for 13 percent of projected ozone depletion. 200 In the case of
halons, the Protocol provides only for a freeze on consumption but not
for reduction in production levels. 20 There are no restrictions on
products which are produced with or contain CFCs and halons. 20 2
And finally, the treatment of production rights of the controlled sub-
stances as proprietary rights, thus allowing a transfer of these
rights, 20 3 raises questions about the efficacy of the control measures.
In light of the growing scientific evidence on the potential risk of
continued ozone depletion, 2°4 the parties to the Protocol must convene
for a review as soon as practical to consider accelerating the rapid
elimination of emissions.20 5 The Protocol needs to be amended, man-
dating an immediate 85 percent CFC emission reduction, leading to an
eventual total phaseout in 10 years2°6 and appropriate restrictions on
other ozone-depleting chemicals. Also, a continuing vigilant review of
the impact of market forces on the development of substitutes and
replacements is essential. A complete, rapid ban on certain uses of
these controlled substances may become necessary.
An analysis of the Protocol reveals further limitations and deficien-
cies in several provisions addressing issues of compliance, trade sanc-
tions and remedies, and developing and planned economy countries.
As a starting point, the Protocol does not define noncompliance,
nor does it establish the necessary institutional machinery to deter-
mine noncompliance with the control measures. It obligates the Par-
ties at their first meeting to create the needed institutional mechanisms
199. Id. at 582.
200. Id. at 680 (Dec. 14, 1988) (statement of a World Watch Institute researcher); Id. at 677
(statement of a NASA official).
201. Montreal Protocol, supra note 21, art. 2, para. 2.
202. See id. at art. 4, paras. 3-4.
203. See id. at art. 2, para. 5.
204. In addition to notes 50-52 supra and accompanying text, see 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA),
Current Reports 668 (Dec. 14, 1988) (reports of rising melanoma rates with depletion of strato-
spheric ozone layer).
205. This is in accordance with Montreal Protocol, supra note 21, at art. 2, para. 10 and art.
6.
206. A promising development occurred on March 2, 1989, when the 12-member European
Economic Community agreed to ban all production and use of CFCs by the end of the century.
Whitney, 12 Europe Nations to Ban Chemicals that Harm Ozone, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1989, at
Al, col. 6. The next day, the United States endorsed the proposal. Shabecoff, Bush Backs Halt
in Use of Pollutants in Ozone, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1989, at 9, col. 1.
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and procedures for the determination of noncompliance. 20 7
UNEP, with its prominent role in negotiations and the signing of
the Protocol, has to be the leading candidate as the lead agency where
the secretariat is located. 20° However, delegates at Montreal feared
that UNEP's limited resources might be strained by assuming the role
as the lead oversight agency.209 Another concern on UNEP's possible
selection is related to its location in Nairobi. 210 An alternative sugges-
tion is that of WMO, which is centrally located in Geneva, and has a
long history of active participation in ozone research and monitoring
projects since 1976.211 Both UNEP and WMO have indicated their
willingness to be the lead agency, hosting the Protocol secretariat.
212
Both of these agencies are well-suited to perform the functions of
the overseeing agency, so the selection of either one is appropriate. An
effective arrangement would be to ask UNEP to be the lead agency,'
with WMO sharing a major responsibility for further research, which
has to be extensive, and monitoring as well.
Once the lead agency is selected, effective procedures must be es-
tablished for verifying emissions reduction. First, however, accurate
statistical data are essential on the production and export-import of
the controlled substances for 1986. The Protocol obligates the Parties
to provide such data to the secretariat. 213 Developed countries can, of
course, satisfy this requirement, but for many developing countries it
may be difficult to meet their obligations, unless the lead agency and
developed countries assist with technical aid.214 Furthermore, objec-
tive fact finding in the international system remains a formidable hur-
dle. It will require ingenuity on the part of the lead agency and the
Parties to agree upon verifiable fact-finding procedures, the lack of
which continues to plague negotiators on arms control issues as well as
those addressing violations of international human rights.
A most important role for the lead agency will be to facilitate re-
search, development, and exchange of information on appropriate
technologies for production of substitutes and replacements for CFCs
and halons, and for their containment, recovery, recycling, and de-
l
207. Montreal Protocol, supra note 21, arts. 8, 11, para. 3(d).
208. See id., art. 12 (functions of the secretariat).
209. See Menyasz, supra note 187, at 534.
210. Id. at 534-35.
211. Id. at 535; 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA), 581 (Nov. 9, 1988).
212. See id.
213. Montreal Protocol, supra note 21, art. 7.
214. See id., arts. 9-10.
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struction. 21 5 As the Protocol obligates the Parties to promote such
activities either directly or "through competent international bod-
ies,"' 216 the role of the lead agency is bound to be crucial in assisting
many developing countries which lack the needed financial resources
as well as technology to find suitable substitutes at acceptable eco-
nomic cost.
Trade sanctions constitute a powerful and persuasive tool to en-
courage wider participation in the Protocol. The Protocol appropri-
ately provides an adequate machinery for mandatory settlement of
parties' disputes under the Convention. 21 7 Policymakers will have to
address two important issues concerning the Protocol language.218
One, the Protocol does not ban or restrict the import from non-parties
of products containing controlled substances or those "produced with,
but not containing controlled substances. '21 9 This loophole needs to
be plugged soon. Second, sanctions on international trade are rarely
taken and are almost never effective. The experience of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade on dispute settlement 220 and of sanc-
tions against Rhodesia and South Africa22' illustrate this point.
The inadequacy of sanctions under international law brings into
sharper focus the lack of enforceable remedies in the Protocol. Volun-
tary compliance based on a recognition of the congruence of national
interest with global interests in halting emissions of ozone-depleting
chemicals, of course, offers the most effective method available to meet
the Protocol objectives. However, to face the issue of noncompliance
by an intransigent state, it is essential that the Parties must address
questions related to state responsibility, liability, and compensation. 222
Needless to say, no existing mechanism can enforce decisions of an
215. See id., art. 9.
216. Id.
217. See text and notes 175-189, supra.
218. See id., art. 4.
219. See id., art. 4, paras. 3-4, art. 10.
220. See generally Hudec, GA 7T Dispute Settlement After the Tokyo Round: An Unfinished
Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145 (1980).
221. See generally C. BROWN-JOHN, MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
- A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1975); L. KAPUNGO, THE UNITED NATIONS AND ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA (1973); Doxey, The Rhodesian Sanctions Experiment, 25 Y.B.
WORLD AFF. 142 (1971); Doxey, International Sanctions: A Frameworkfor Analysis with Special
Reference to the U.N. and South Africa, 26 INT'L ORG. 527 (1972); Report of the U.N. Special
Committee on Apartheid, Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa: Implementa-
tion by States of United Nations Resolutions on Apartheid, U.N. Doc. A/9168 (1973) (id. at 5,
"the United Nations Action on apartheid has remained far from effective.") U.N. sanctions
continue to have little effect on the South African economy.
222. See Nanda & Bailey, supra note 182; 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA), 468 (Sept. 1988) (re-




international body against a major power or even not so major a state.
This statement is especially valid on the use of force in the interna-
tional arena, as witnessed in conflicts in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Cen-
tral America, and between Iran and Iraq. However, the general
proposition holds, since there are no effective remedies that a world
body can impose. The International Court of Justice's decision in Nic-
aragua v. U.S.223 provides an apt illustration of such lack of
enforcement.
The Protocol's concern with the needs of developing countries224
and centrally planned economies225 has some validity. After all, devel-
oping countries are not big consumers of controlled substances, 226 and
it may be considered necessary for development purposes that some
allowance be made for some increases of such substances in their pro-
duction and consumption. Given the percentage of global population
covered under this exception, the Parties must ensure in their review
after five years that it has not resulted in significantly increasing global
consumption of CFCs and halons. 227 It may, however, be difficult to
revise the exception in favor of centrally planned economies because of
the short-term time frame and a limited increase in per capita con-
sumption levels. 228
In sum, drastic modifications of the Protocol are essential, which
will test the will and vision of the Parties at their first review meeting
as well as succeeding meetings.
VII. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE PROTOCOL
A. Developments in the United States
The signing of the Montreal Protocol was a signal to industry to
move swiftly in their efforts at recycling CFCs, chemically modifying
them, or finding suitable replacements to meet the reductions called
for in the Protocol. 229 In contrast with their earlier position marked
223. 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Merits) provides an apt illustration.
224. Montreal Protocol, supra note 21, art. 5.
225. Id., art. 2, para. 6.
226. See id., art. 5, para. 9; Reportedly, the developing countries consume an average .2
kilograms per capita (kg/capita) annually, which under the Protocol will be permitted to rise to
.3 kg/capita annually. Menyasz, supra note 187, at 534.
227. But see Menyasz, supra note 187, at 534 (UNEP executive director's statement to the
effect that developing countries are financially and technically incapable of taking advantage of
the favorable treatment they are provided under the Protocol).
228. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 21, art. 2, para. 6.
229. See, e.g., Maugh II & Stammer, Loss of Ozone Calls for Speedy Action; Experts Say, L.A.
Times, March 21, 1988, at 16, cols. 2-3.
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by combative responses to their critics, 230 DuPont, the world's largest
manufacturer of CFCs, announced in March 1988 its plans to phase
out all production of the chemicals. 231 Although no target date was
set for ending production of CFCs, a company official said that "re-
ducing output by at least 95 percent by the beginning of the next cen-
tury was a 'reasonable goal.' ",232 Reportedly, industry does not
consider compliance with the Protocol to require major efforts. 233
The United States was among the first states to ratify the Montreal
Protocol.234 The Protocol took effect on January 1, 1989,235 when the
following conditions had been met: one, that the Vienna Convention
enter into force, which occurred on September 22, 1988;236 and two,
that at least 11 parties to the Protocol representing at least two-thirds
of 1986 estimated global consumption of the covered substances ratify
the Protocol, which took place in December 1988.237
In the meantime, while the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
and the U.S. Congress have been actively pursuing the issue, states and
cities have also begun to take the initiative.238 EPA is the lead agency
responsible for the implementation of the Protocol, 239 and members of
Congress have demonstrated their concern by holding hearings and
proposing legislation on the subject. 240
1. EPA Rulemaking in Response to the 1987 Protocol
As early as in 1978, the EPA and the Food and Drug Administra-
tion had banned the use of CFCs as aerosol propellants in most aerosol
230. See, e.g., Glaberson, Behind DuPont's Shift on Loss of Ozone Layer, N.Y. Times, Mar.
26, 1988, at 17, col. 3.
231. See Shabecoff, DuPont to Stop Making Chemicals that Peril Ozone, N.Y. Times, Mar.
25, 1988, at Al, col. 2.
232. Id. at col. 2. For a representative earlier position of the industry, see STRATOSPHERIC
OZONE DEPLETION & CFCs, supra note 44, at 273 (statement of Chemical Manufacturers Asso-
ciation), and 360, 384, 394, 402, 412, 499, 584, 657, 660 (statements of several industry
representatives).
233. See Shabecoff, Industry Acts to Curb Peril in Ozone Loss, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1988, at
A 1, col. 1.
234. 88 DEP'T ST. BULL., June 1988, at 68.
235. 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA), 3 (Jan. 11, 1989).
236. 88 DEP'T ST. BULL., Aug. 1988, at 92.
237. 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA), 3 (Jan. 11, 1989).
238. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1988, at 11, col. I (a foam producer settles a lawsuit
brought by the State of Massachusetts to stop CFC emissions in violation of state regulations); 11
Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA), 333 (June 8, 1988) (action by Minnesota); id. at 457 (Aug. 10, 1988)
(action by the City of Los Angeles).
239. EPA's rule-making statutory authority is pursuant to the 1977 Clean Air Act Amend-
ments, § 157(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7457(b) (1977). For the Act, see id., §§ 7450-7459 (1977).
240. See infra notes 273-291 and accompanying text.
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products such as spray cans.241 After the ban went into effect, CFC
manufacturers found new applications for their product. This resulted
in an unsuccessful attempt to reduce total CFC production. With the
signing of the Montreal Protocol, however, a new opportunity has
arisen to reduce production and consumption of ozone depleting
chemicals such as CFCs and halons. As part of its obligation to imple-
ment the 1987 Montreal Protocol, the United States is required to ob-
tain data on U.S. 1986 production, exports, and imports of all of the
controlled substances 242 that are covered in the Protocol. On Decem-
ber 14, 1987, the EPA therefore required all U.S. firms which pro-
duced, exported, or imported the controlled substances to report by
January 14, 1988, the amount of CFCs that a company produced, ex-
ported, or imported, in 1986.243
Furthermore, the EPA proposed regulations under § 157(b) of the
1977 Clean Air Act 244 to implement and correspond to the terms of
the 1987 Montreal Protocol.245 Terms of Section 157(b) authorize the
EPA Administrator to promulgate regulations to control any sub-
stance, process, practice, or activity which may reasonably be antici-
pated to affect the stratosphere, "if such effect may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." Essentially, the Ad-
241. See 43 Fed. Reg. 11301, 11318 (1978). The EPA also calculated the costs and benefits
of the proposed regulation. The costs would total approximately $27 billion for the period 1989-
2075, while the benefits were estimated to range from $29 billion to $340 trillion for the same
time period. See 52 Fed. Reg. 47513 (1987).
242. CFCs and halons as set out in Annex A of the Protocol. See supra note 145.
243. 52 Fed. Reg. 47486, 47488 (1987) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82).
244. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7457(b) (1977).
245. 52 Fed. Reg. 47498 (1987). According to EPA's estimates, compliance with the Proto-
col by most states would reduce ozone depletion to 1.3 percent by the year 2075. See Table 2
below.
TABLE 2
OZONE DEPLETION LEVELS FOR
ALTERNATIVE REDUCTION OPTIONS
(Percent depletion of total column ozone]
Case 2000 2025 2050 2075
1. No Controls. 0.9 3.9 12.4 39.9
2. CFC freeze.. 0.8 2.3 4.3 6.2
3. CFC 20% .. 0.8 1.9 3.4 5.0
4. CFC 50% .. 0.8 1.5 2.3 3.2
5. CFC 80% .. 0.8 1.2 1.6 2.2
6. CFC 50%/ 0.8 1.3 1.6 1.3
Halon freeze
7. CFC 50%/ 0.8 1.2 1.4 1.2
Halon freeze/
U.S. 80% ...
8. U.S. only/ 0.8 3.1 8.5 20.4
CFC 50% ..
52 Fed. Reg. 47499 (1987). The EPA had also evaluated the risks of ozone depletion in EPA,
ASSESSING THE RISKS OF TRACE GASES THAT CAN MODIFY THE STRATOSPHERE (Dec. 1987).
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ministrator is not required to prove that a substance, process, practice,
or activity does in fact deplete stratospheric ozone levels before such
regulation may be enacted.246
The EPA believes that the 1987 Montreal Protocol's requirements
are an appropriate response at this time to the potential ozone deple-
tion problem. 247 Thus, EPA proposed a control strategy that would
implement the 1987 Montreal Protocol. First, the EPA decided that
requiring the U.S. to do more than the Protocol requires could be
counterproductive since other nations might have less incentive to join
the Protocol. The lack of international support which occurred when
the U.S. banned CFCs in aerosols shows that unilateral U.S. action
does not necessarily lead other nations to reduce their emissions. 248
The EPA's logic is correct. However, while steps must be taken to
ensure that other nations join the United States in an attempt to find
an effective solution to the problem, it is essential that the United
States take an aggressive leadership role to fight for future reductions
at subsequent meetings that are required to be held under the 1987
Protocol. Also, regardless of what other nations do, the U.S. should
require that CFC- or halon-containing products be labelled as such
and that the consumer be informed of the potential harms resulting
from a product's use. This will allow informed consumers the choice
to purchase products that do not contain CFCs and halons if an alter-
native exists.249
The EPA considered control strategies such as regulatory fees,
auctioned rights, engineering controls, and chemical bans. 250 It pro-
posed to allocate "rights equal to the quantity of allowable production
and consumption to producers and importers of controlled substances
in 1986, [stating that] [s]ince producers and importers are small in
number (probably no more than 15 to 20), it would be far less burden-
some to allocate rights to them instead of users. '251 Firms could buy
246. Pursuant to § 113b of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7413 (1977), the EPA can also
impose penalties for noncompliance of up to $25,000 per day per violation. Each kilogram of
controlled substance produced or imported beyond a firm's allocated rights would be considered
to be a separate violation. EPA also has the authority to seek injunctive relief to halt further
production or imports if a firm has already reached its allocated rights limit for the year. 52 Fed.
Reg. 47505 (1987). The EPA may bring criminal penalties against persons who knowingly vio-
late the allocated rights limitation system. Id. These penalties will help to enforce the 1987
Protocol's limitations upon U.S. producers and importers of the controlled substances as set out
in the Protocol.
247. 52 Fed. Reg. 47499 (1987).
248. Id.
249. EPA is still studying the question. See infra note 268.
250. See 52 Fed. Reg. 47499-500 (1987).
251. Id. at 47500.
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and sell rights to respond to changes or market conditions.
This proposal will erect formidable barriers to entry since the pres-
ent CFC producers and importers would have the allocated rights to
produce or import CFCs. Production rights held by a firm would au-
thorize them to produce up to the level of production rights held by
the firm. 25 2
Limiting production and granting specific production rights to a
handful of companies has the potential for windfall profits that could
be reaped by such companies, especially if the supply of controlled
substances is decreased and the demand for the controlled substances
stays the same or increases. The EPA did address the question "as to
whether possible profits from continued production of the restricted
chemicals might have the undesired effect of delaying the introduction
of less profitable chemical substitutes. '253
As a result of the controlled marketplace, a windfall profits tax
must be levied against the producers and importers of the controlled
substances in order to recover the increased earnings that result be-
cause of the restricted supply. 254 The funds could also be used to ad-
minister the controlled substances program, and to enforce any
violation of the program. It also seems desirable to set up a research
fund with the tax money to support further research of new chemicals
that could be used as safe substitutes for the controlled substances.
This would insure U.S. implementation of Article 9 of the 1987 Mon-
treal Protocol which calls for the promotion of research.
Subsequently, in May 1988, following a public hearing on its pro-
posed rules, the EPA issued a supplementary proposal setting forth
company-specific apportionments of production and consumption
rights.255 Then on August 12, 1988, the EPA promulgated its final
rule on protection of stratospheric ozone. 256 The rule is to take effect
upon the day the Montreal Protocol enters into force.257
The Agency interpreted § 157 (b) as not requiring the Agency to
prevent potential harm,258 but authorizing it to assess the risks of
252. Id. at 47500-501.
253. Id. at 47507.
254. EPA has subsequently considered adding a regulatory fee to supplement the allocated
quota system. 53 Fed. Reg. 30603, 30605-36010 (1988).
255. 53 Fed. Reg. 18800 (1988).
256. 53 Fed. Reg. 30566 (1988). See also EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: PROTEC-
TION OF STRATOSPHERIC OZONE (Aug. 1988).
257. 53 Fed. Reg. 30566 (1988).
258. 53 Fed. Reg. at 30568. EPA said: "Reasonably anticipated harm connotes a likely harm
or a harm whose likelihood and magnitude together are large enough to make preventive meas-
ures reasonable." Id.
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stratospheric ozone depletion and to regulate as the assessment war-
rants.259 Responding to the critics' complaint that the Montreal Pro-
tocol and consequently EPA's proposed rule "did not go far enough
fast enough in requiring reductions in ozone-depleting substances," 26°
for what was needed was a virtual phase-out of CFCs and halons, 26 1
the Agency made one significant concession. While proclaiming the
final rule, the EPA gave an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking,
which discussed replacing allocated quotas with an auction system or
supplementing the final rule with a regulatory fee and/or engineering
controls or bans on specific uses of CFCs and halons. 262
Estimating that windfall profit could range from $1.8 to $7.2 bil-
lion through the turn of the century, 263 the existence of which could
result in delaying the introduction of chemical substitutes,264 the EPA
left the question of regulatory fees, 265 auctions, 26 6 a command-and-
control system, 267 and labelling 26 for future action, following public
comments on the proposal.
The EPA's review of the impact of these alternative strategies to
implement the Montreal Protocol is thorough and its approach rea-
sonable and sound. It has had ample experience with "controlled
trading" in its effort to meet the ambient air quality standard under
the Clean Air Act.269 The EPA, by virtue of its experience with emis-
sions trading,270 its research on economic and legal issues involved in
ozone regulatory schemes, 271 and solicited public comments it receives
259. Id. See also id. at 30568-30573.
260. Id. at 30574.
261. Id.
262. See id. at 30604 (1988).
263. Id. at 30606.
264. Id.
265. See id. at 30606-14.
266. See id. at 30610-14.
267. See id. at 30614-18.
268. See id. at 30618-19.
269. As amended in 1977, Clean Air Acts Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat.
685, amended by Safe Drinking Water Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-190, § 14, 91 Stat.
1393, 1399-1405, recodified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (earlier codification at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-
1858a).
270. See generally Calvo y Gonzales, Markets in Air: Problems and Prospects of Controlled
Trading, 5 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 377, 396-430 (1981); Landau, Economic Dream or Environ-
mental Nightmare? The Legality of the "Bubble Concept" in Air and Water Pollution Control, 8
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 741 (1980); Mandelkar & Sherry, Emission Quota Strategies as an Air
Pollution Control Technique, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q.. 401 (1976); Comment, Regulating with a Carrot:
Experimenting with Incentives for Clean Air, 31 BUFFALO L. REV. 193, 201-31 (1982); Note, The
EPA's Bubble Concept After Alabama Power, 32 STAN. L. REV. 943 (1980).
271. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 30606 (EPA initiated two studies of its own to examine the issues of
quotas and regulatory fees). For citations to these studies by S. Decaino and Sobotkin & Co.,
Inc., see id. at 30619.
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from concerned parties, 272 is well suited to devise a workable, equita-
ble, and efficient scheme.
2. Action in Congress
The Committee on Science, Space, and Technology of the U.S.
House of Representatives held a hearing in October 1987 to review the
results of the 1987 Antarctic Ozone expedition. 273 Those testifying
included representatives from the U.S. Department of State, 274
EPA, 27 5 NASA, 2 7 6 NOAA, 277 and National Science Foundation.27 8
The focus was on the 'very clear chemical signature' in the evolution
of the Antarctic ozone hole,279 and on the adoption and ratification of
the Montreal Protocol. 280 Assistant Secretary of State John Negro-
ponte surmised that with the signing of the Montreal Protocol, "we
have entered into a new era of global environmental management," for
changes in the ozone layer affect the entire world. 28 '
In July 1988, U.S. Senators Robert Stafford and Timothy Wirth
each introduced a broad piece of legislation in the United States Sen-
ate,282 addressing primarily the questions of stratospheric ozone deple-
tion and the greenhouse effect respectively. Senator Tim Wirth's bill
called for a reassessment of the control measures within a year of the
enactment of the bill.283 It also required the U.S. Secretary of State to
actively encourage the adoption of additional control measures requiring
the virtual elimination of emissions of all substances identified in the
Montreal Protocol within five to seven years from the date of enactment
of this title and appropriate control measures for other ozone-depleting
chemicals not identified in the Montreal Protocol.284
272. See id. at 30607-19.
273. See Review of the Results of the Antarctic Ozone Expedition, Hearings Before the Com-
mittee on Science, Space, and Technology of the House of Representatives, Oct. 29, 1987., 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1988).
274. Id. at 12-18 (testimony and statement of John D. Negroponte, Assistant Secretary for
Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, U.S. Department of State).
275. Id. at 19-26 (testimony and statement of A. James Barnes, Deputy Administrator,
EPA).
276. Id. at 340-60 (testimony and statement of Robert T. Watson, Chief, Upper Atmosphere
Research Program, NASA).
277. Id. at 361-72 (testimony and statement of Adrian Tuck, Aeronomy Lab, NOAA).
278. Id. at 373-82 (testimony and statements of NSF representatives).
279. See, e.g., id. at 340-60, 361, 362-63 (testimony of Adrian Tuck, a strong advocate of
dynamism and 'meteorological signatures').
280. See generally id. at 3-4, 12-26.
281. Id. at 12.
282. See Stafford Bill and Wirth Bill, supra note 12.
283. Worth Bill, supra note 12, at § 1503(a).
284. Id. at § 1503(b).
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With slight modifications, Senator Wirth reintroduced the bill on Feb-
ruary 2, 1989.285
Senator Stafford's bill, entitled "The Global Environmental Pro-
tection Act of 1988, ''286 proposed stringent controls, providing for a
virtual elimination of halogenated CFC use and sale by 1999.287 The
Act required the President of the United States to request the United
Nations to establish a new temporary agency, to be headed by the
UNEP director, to:
(1) Coordinate international efforts to minimize and mitigate the ef-
fects of unavoidable environmental alterations; and
(2) provide financial, technical and other assistance to developing na-
tions to facilitate improvements in their domestic standards of living
while minimizing or eliminating contributions to global, continental and
sub-continental scale environmental damages. 288
In introducing the bill, Senator Stafford urged the U.S. Senate to take
the lead in the ongoing efforts toward protection of the environ-
ment.2 9 While the bill was not enacted by the 100th Congress, it was
reintroduced in the 101st Congress by Senator Patrick Leahy. 290 An-
other bill of note introduced in the 101st Congress is the Global Envi-
ronment Research and Policy Act of 1989, which provides a
mechanism for planning and coordinating long-term research efforts
on global climate change involving more than two federal agencies. 291
3. EPA Findings
In August 1988, the EPA released a report entitled, Future Con-
centrations of Stratospheric Chlorine and Bromine,292 which relates
rates of emissions to stratospheric levels of chlorine and bromine. It
also examines the reductions required "to stabilize the atmosphere at
285. Senate Bill 324, cosponsored by 30 Senators, 135 CONG. REC. S1036 (daily ed., Feb. 2,
1989).
286. Stafford Bill, supra note 12, at 10112, 10282.
287. Id., §§ 102(6), 103, 107(f). Section 107(f) provides, "Effective January, 1999, it shall be
unlawful for any person to produce or release [substances to be phased-out and regulated, includ-
ing halogenated CFCs] for any use other than medical purposes."
Section 103(b) states the national goal:
[T]o eliminate atmospheric emissions of manufactured substances with ozone depleting po-
tential, including chlorofluorcarbons and other halogenated carbons with ozone depleting
potential, and to reduce significantly emissions of other gases caused by human activities
that are likely to affect adversely the global climate.
288. Id. § 302(a).
289. Stafford Bill, supra note 12, at 10114.
290. Senate Bill 333, 135 CONG. REC. S1069 (daily ed., Feb. 2, 1989).
291. 135 CONG. REC. E362 (daily ed., Feb. 9, 1989); id., S522 (daily ed., Jan. 25, 1989).
292. EPA, Future Concentrations of Stratospheric Chlorine and Bromine (Office of Air and
Radiation, Aug. 1988) [hereinafter Future Chlorine and Bromine Concentrations].
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current levels of chlorine and bromine. '293
The report states that "chlorine and bromine levels will increase
substantially from current levels" even with substantial global partici-
pation in the Montreal Protocol.294 Specifically, chlorine levels are
likely to grow by 2075 by a factor of three from current levels, even
with 100 percent global participation in the Protocol, assuming methyl
chloroform emissions grow, which the Protocol does not regulate. 295
Assuming that methyl chloroform emissions do not grow, chlorine
levels would still grow by a factor of 2.2 by 2075, and assuming a total
elimination of emissions, "stratospheric chlorine levels will continue to
grow for about 6-8 years" because of transport delays to the strato-
sphere and long life times of these compounds. 296
The report summary noted:
Very large increases in Clx and halon abundances would have been
expected if the use and emissions of chlorine-containing compounds and
halons had been allowed to increase without limit. The provisions of the
Montreal Protocol will reduce the amount of the increase significantly,
but will not keep the levels of Clx and halons in the stratosphere from
increasing. Significant additional reductions in emissions are required to
keep the levels from increasing, possibly including a complete phaseout
of the fully-halogenated compounds and a freeze on methyl chloroform.
The rate of substitution with partially-halogenated chlorine-containing
compounds will also influence future chlorine levels.297
Subsequently, in September 1988, the EPA Administrator called
for a strengthening of the Protocol, "with a near-total phase-out of
chlorofluorocarbons as the goal. ' '298 He stated that, persuaded by the
recent scientific data of the need to do more, he had written the UNEP
and "his international counterparts, urging them to consider tighten-
ing the agreement." 299 He, however, was not sure whether "we ought
to phase out [the regulated chemicals] 50 percent in 10 years and 95
percent in 15 years, or it may be that we ought to hit 95 percent in 10
years." 3oo
B. International Developments
Other notable developments since the signing of the Protocol in-




297. Id. at 27.
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elude, in addition to its ratification by 29 states and the European Eco-
nomic Community by December 31, 1988,301 further research and
action by governments in several countries, including Canada,30 2 Eu-
ropean countries, 30 3 and Japan. 3°4 Among international organiza-
tions, UNEP30 5 and WM0 30 6 remain the most active entities in
conducting and promoting further research, while the European Com-
munity Commission has actively pursued the subject of implementa-
tion in Europe. 30 7  In March 1989, the European Economic
Community agreed to a ban on CFCs by the turn of the century. 30 8
Industry 3°9 and consumers groups310 have also participated in work-
ing toward the implementation of the Protocol.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The growing concern with stratospheric ozone depletion found
concrete expression initially in the 1985 Vienna Convention and two
years later in the Montreal Protocol. The Vienna Convention pro-
vided a framework initially for international cooperative efforts in re-
search and monitoring as well as information exchange, and later for
presenting firm commitments and obligations in the Montreal Proto-
col. The shocking revelation of the antarctic ozone hole spurred the
world community to take anticipatory action to protect the fragile
ozone layer.
Would early accords to prevent further damage to the ozone layer
have been possible without the ozone hole? An interesting question,
but more important inquiry relates to impact on the future develop-
ment of international environmental law. As a prospective prescrip-
tive instrument, could it provide a model for agreements on such
301. 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 3 (Jan. 11, 1989).
302. See, e.g., 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA), 110 (Feb. 10, 1988); id. at 310 (July 13, 1988).
303. Id. at 156, 158 (Mar. 9, 1988), 440 (Aug. 10, 1988), 601 (Nov. 9, 1988), 643 (Dec. 14,
1988) (United Kingdom); id. at 157 (Mar. 9, 1988) (West Germany); id. at 211 (April 13, 1988)
(the Netherlands and Sweden).
304. E.g., 10 id. at 582 (Nov. 11, 1987), 11 id. at 157-58 (Mar. 9,1988), 11 id. at 212 (April
13, 1988).
305. E.g., 11 id. at 225 (April 13, 1988), 11 id. at 581, 581-84 (Nov. 9, 1988), 11 id at 644,
644-45 (Dec. 14, 1988).
306. E.g., 11 id. at 581 (Nov. 9, 1988), 11 id. at 644, 644-45 (Dec. 14, 1988).
307. E.g., 11 id. at 155 (Mar. 9, 1988), 11 id. at 314, 314-15 (June 8, 1988), 11 id. at 581-82,
584-85 (Nov. 9, 1988).
308. See supra note 206.
309. E.g., 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA), 110, 112-13 (Feb. 10, 1988), id. at 158 (Mar. 9, 1988),
id. at 227-28 (April 13, 1988), id. at 324 (June 8, 1988), id. at 520, 520-521 (Oct. 1988), id. at 650
(Dec. 14, 1988).
310. E.g., 10 Int' Env't Rep. (BNA), 492 (Oct. 14, 1987) (Swiss consumers federation seeking
boycott of aerosols containing CFCs).
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matters as transboundary air pollution, especially the acid rain issue,
and global warming? An important feature of the ozone issue, per-
haps distinguishing it from others such as acid rain, is that the eco-
nomic cost of the proscription is not prohibitive. Another attractive
feature of the Montreal Protocol, after it becomes operational, is that
Parties will not face unfair competition from non-Parties. In the de-
velopment of international environmental law, the Protocol certainly
stands as a milestone.
Next, a speedy reappraisal of the Montreal Protocol's control
mechanisms is in order. It is essential that controls are responsive to
the latest scientific findings, which call for much greater reductions
than were proposed in the 1987 Protocol. Lee Thomas and Mostafa
Tolba 3 t1 have already called for a strengthening of the Protocol, in
light of findings estimating increases in chlorine levels, even given opti-
mistic assumptions concerning the implementation of the Protocol. 31 2
Without further reductions in ozone depletants, further depletion in
stratospheric ozone levels will occur and plague our planet for many
centuries to come. The only way to actually test out our scientific
theories is to let nature take its course and see if future reality mirrors
today's predictions. We live in an imperfect world with imperfect ac-
cess to information and imperfect scientific knowledge which makes
decision-making imperfect. If humanity has to err, where the future of
human health, welfare, and the environment is concerned, it makes
sense to err on the side of over-protection instead of acting too little
too late. The risks are too high to act half-heartedly toward prevent-
ing further ozone destruction in the future.
The need is critical for extensive and intensified research on ozone-
depletion questions, especially on finding suitable substitutes for CFCs
and halons, on recycling them, and on making the necessary design
changes to reduce their emissions in their use as coolants and solvents,
and as important ingredients in the production of foam. 31 3 It is
equally important that developing countries receive the appropriate
transfer of technologies and technical assistance they sorely need.
Will the international community be able to respond in time? Al-
bert Schweitzer once said that "[M]an has lost the capacity to foresee
and to forestall. He will end by destroying the earth. ' 31 4 By our ac-
tions on this major challenge of our time, the international community
can prove him wrong.
311. EPA Administrator and UNEP Executive Director, respectively.
312. 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA), 556 (Oct. 1988).
313. See generally discussion at 53 Fed. Reg. 47509-47511 (1987).
314. R. CARSON, SILENT SPRING vii (1962).
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